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Abstract
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issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
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This paper provides an overview of the literature on tax 
morale and tax compliance. Most of the material here 
is based on research that I have conducted together 
with my co-authors over the last 10 years. Europe has a 
dominant place in this paper. Sometimes results derived 
This paper is a product of the Human Development Economics Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region. It is part of a larger 
effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions 
around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author 
may be contacted at benno.torgler@qut.edu.au. 
from other countries are discussed that could be relevant 
for Europe. The overall findings show the importance 
of accountability, democratic governance, efficient, and 
transparent legal structures and therefore trust within the 
society to enforce tax compliance and tax morale. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION:  




Adams‘ book (1993) begins with the inscription found over the entrance to the Internal 
Revenue Service building: ―Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society‖. An essential 
question for policymakers is the extent to which individuals are willing to pay this price. 
The  state-building  process  in  post-communist  societies  and  state-maintaining  element 
requires the collection and the use of revenues. Over the last several decades, there has 
been a growing interest in theoretical, empirical, and experimental work on all aspects of 
tax compliance and tax evasion.  A common theme in  much of this  work is  that the 
traditional economics-of-crime approach to compliance, while containing many insights, 
is simply inadequate as a framework for more fully understanding why people pay taxes.  
Rather, the basic model of individual choice must be expanded by introducing some 
aspects of behavior or motivation considered explicitly by other social sciences.  Many of 
these  aspects  can  be  discussed  under  the  general  rubric  of  ―behavioral  economics‖, 
broadly  defined  as  an  approach  that  uses  methods  and  evidence  from  other  social 
sciences to inform the analysis of individual and group decision making. This  report 
represents  an attempt to review exactly this  new framework of compliance:  one that 
moves beyond the ―economics of crime‖ perspective, one that provides a more complete 
understanding of individual (and group) decisions, and one that is more consistent with 
empirical evidence. In general, the effect of cultural or social norms and of social capital 
on tax compliance behavior is not well understood and addressing this gap is the focus of 
the present research report. 
It is useful from the start to identify more fully the basic insight – and the basic 
problem  –  with  the  standard  economic  approach  to  compliance.    To  date,  the  basic 
theoretical model used in nearly all research on tax compliance begins with Becker‘s 
(1968)  economics-of-crime  model  first  applied  to  tax  compliance  by  Allingham  and 
Sandmo (1972).
 Here a rational individual is viewed as maximizing the expected utility 
of the tax evasion gamble, by weighing the benefits of successful cheating against the 
risky prospect of detection and punishment. Through this process, an outcome is reached   3 
where  the  individual  pays  taxes  because  he  or  she  is  afraid  of  getting  caught  and 
penalized if he or she does not report all income. The obvious policy implication here is 
that enforcement matters because enforcement can affect the financial considerations that 
motivate – at least in part – an individual‘s compliance choices. However, it is essential 
to recognize that this approach also concludes that an individual pays taxes because - and 
only because - of the economic consequences of detection and punishment.
  Again, this is 
a plausible and productive insight, with the obvious implication that the government can 
encourage greater tax compliance by increasing the audit and the penalty rates.  The 
many  extensions  of  this  economics-of-crime  approach  considerably  complicate  the 
theoretical  analyses,  and  generally  render  clear-cut  analytical  results  impossible.  
Nevertheless,  these extensions  retain the basic  approach and result:  individuals  focus 
exclusively on the financial incentives of the evasion gamble, and individuals pay taxes 
solely because they fear detection and punishment. 
However,  it  is  clear  to  many  observers  that  compliance  cannot  be  explained 
entirely by such purely financial considerations, especially those generated by the level of 
enforcement.  The  percentage  of  individual  income  tax  returns  that  are  subject  to  a 
thorough tax audit is generally quite small in most countries, tallying less than 1 percent 
of all returns.  Similarly, the penalty on even fraudulent evasion seldom exceeds more 
than  the  amount  of  unpaid  taxes,  and  these  penalties  are  infrequently  imposed;  civil 
penalties  on  non-fraudulent  evasion  are  even  smaller.  Taxpayer  audits  are  a  central 
feature  of  the  voluntary  compliance  system  in  all  countries,  largely  because  more 
frequent audits are thought to reduce tax evasion.  Even so, a purely economic analysis of 
the  evasion  gamble  suggests  that  most  rational  individuals  should  either  underreport 
income  not  subject  to  source  withholding  or  over-claim  deductions  not  subject  to 
independent  verification  because  it  is  extremely  unlikely  that  such  cheating  will  be 
caught and penalized.  However, even in the least compliant countries evasion never rises 
to levels predicted by a purely economic analysis, and in fact there are often substantial 
numbers of individuals who apparently pay all (or most) of their taxes all (or most) of the 
time, regardless of the financial incentives they face from the enforcement regime. 
The basic model of individual compliance behavior therefore implies that rational 
individuals  (especially  those  whose  incomes  are  not  subject  to  third-party  sources  of   4 
information) should report virtually no income.  Although compliance varies significantly 
across countries and tax regimes and is often quite low, compliance seldom falls to a 
level predicted by the standard economic theory of compliance.  It seems implausible that 
government enforcement activities alone can account for these levels of compliance; the 
basic  model  is  certainly  unable  to  explain  this  behavior.  Indeed,  the  puzzle  of  tax 
compliance  behavior  may  well  be  why  people  pay  taxes,  not  why  they  evade  them 
(Slemrod, 1992; Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007a; Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler, 
2010).  This observation suggests that the compliance decision must be affected in ways 
not fully captured by the basic economics-of-crime approach. But what are the reasons 
behind  this  puzzle  of  tax  compliance?  The  literature  in  the  last  couple  of  years  has 
stressed that the social norm of compliance or tax morale may help to explain why people 
willingly conform. If tax morale is a key determinant in enhancing tax compliance there 
are a variety of policies besides coercion that will help to reduce tax fraud. To derive 
policy recommendation from these results it is necessary to go a step further and explore 
the determinants of tax morale. Thus, an increasing number of studies have explored the 
factors that shape tax morale in an attempt to gain a broader understanding of this issue 
(see, e.g., Torgler, 2007a). However, there is still a lack of empirical evidence on the link 
between  attitudes  and  behaviour  in  the  tax  compliance  literature.  It  is  important  to 
address this deficiency because the state and the tax administration have a variety of 
methods available to influence tax compliance; traditional approaches such as deterrence 
can be seen as just one possible instrument. Historical examples also indicate that states 
―can be strong with regards to specific capacities, for instance coercion and repression, 
without  ―producing‖  voluntary  compliance,  a  phenomenon  to  be  observed  in  many 
transition countries...  This also means that they are weak with regard to their political 
capacity to rely on voluntary compliance‖ (Hayoz and Hug, 2007, p. 9). Thus, knowledge 
about the causes and consequences of tax morale could lead to a better tax policy through 
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II. THE IMPACT OF TAX MORALE ON TAX COMPLIANCE 
 
 
1. Overview and Theoretical Considerations 
Since the 1990s, the issue of tax morale has increasingly attracted attention. The question 
of why so many people pay their taxes, despite low fine and audit probabilities, has 
become a central issue in the tax compliance literature. Erard and Feinstein (1994) stress 
the relevance of integrating moral sentiments into the models to provide a reasonable 
explanation of actual compliance behaviour. Assessing the literature, Andreoni, Erard 
and Feinstein (1998) also point out that ―adding moral and social dynamics to models of 
tax  compliance  is  as  yet  a  largely  undeveloped  area  of  research‖  (p.  852).  Many 
researchers maintain that a considerable portion of taxpayers are always honest. There are 
some taxpayers who are ―simply predisposed not to evade‖ (Long and Swinger, 1991, p. 
130)  and  thus  do  not  even  search  for  ways  to  cheat  at  taxes  (see  Frey,  1999).  
Furthermore, Elffers (2000) reasons that not everyone with ―an inclination to dodge his 
taxes is able to translate his intention into action‖ (p. 187). Many individuals do not have 
the opportunity or the knowledge and resources to evade. Frey and Schneider (2000) 
point out that moral costs could act as a disincentive to be active in the illegal sector: ―A 
good citizen has moral qualms to undertake a forbidden activity. These moral costs are 
closely related to ‗tax morale,‘ which motivates citizens to pay their dues to the state‖ (p. 
6). An increase in tax morale increases the moral costs of behaving illegally and therefore 
reduces the incentives to evade taxes. Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) claim that the choice 
between tax compliance and evasion is not only made on the grounds of sanctions but 
also on the grounds of a set of attitudes and norms. Lewis (1982) contends ―it could be 
that tax evasion is the only channel through which taxpayers can express their antipathy 
… we can be confident in our general prediction that if tax attitudes become worse, tax 
evasion will increase‖ (p. 165, 177).  
Polinsky and Shavell (2000), who present a survey of the economic theory of 
public enforcement of law, draw attention to the issue of social norms for future research. 
Social  norms  can  be  seen  as  a  general  alternative  to  law  enforcement  in  channeling 
individuals‘ behavior. The violation of social norms has consequences including internal   6 
sanctions  (guilt,  remorse)  or  external  legal  and  social  sanctions  such  as  gossip  and 
ostracism. Polinsky and Shavel (2000) explain that there is an expanding literature on 
social norms because of their influence on behavior, their role as a substitute for and 
supplement to formal laws and the possibility that laws themselves can influence social 
norms.  
In  literature  we  find  interesting  theories  that  enable  us  to  integrate  moral 
constraints in a rational taxpayer model. One theory taking an altruistic approach (e.g., 
Chung 1976), involves taxpayers who are not only interested in their own welfare but are 
also  concerned  with  societal  welfare.  The  decision  to  evade  is  constrained  by  the 
knowledge that their evasion will reduce the amount of resources available for social 
welfare. Another theory is the ‗Kantian‘ morality approach (see Laffont, 1975; Sugden, 
1984). This methodology is broadly related to Kant‘s definition of morality and is based 
on the assumption that a fair tax is a tax which a taxpayer believes to be fair for all other 
taxpayers to pay. A false declaration will generate anxiety, guilt or a reduction in the 
taxpayer‘s self-image. It is assumed that a taxpayer only experiences these detrimental 
effects if he believes that his tax share is lower than what is defined as fair. If he is paying 
a higher amount, evasion can be seen as a sort of self-defense. 
Erard  and  Feinstein  (1994)  incorporate  shame  and  guilt  directly  into  the 
taxpayer‘s utility. They hypothesize that a taxpayer feels guilty when he under-reports 
and escapes detection yet conversely also feels ashamed when he under-reports and gets 
caught. Gordon (1989) modifies the standard model by including non-pecuniary costs of 
evasion. He appeals to the literature on social customs (see Akerlof, 1980; Naylor, 1989) 
to provide a reason why utility loss can be incurred by the act of evading. Non-pecuniary 
or psychic cost increases as evasion increases, and Gordon develops a model which can 
explain why some taxpayers refuse a favorable evasion game. Furthermore, dishonesty is 
endogenized as reputation cost. Non-pecuniary costs have a dynamic component, varying 
inversely  with  the  number  of  individuals  having  evaded  in  the  previous  period. 
Interestingly, there is a stable interior equilibrium where evaders and honest individuals 
coexist. However, non-pecuniary costs are exogenous to the analysis so that they can 
rationalize,  but  not  explain,  differences  in  tax  behavior  across  consumers  or  social 
groups.   7 
Myles and Naylor (1996) state that the model developed by Gordon is a step 
forward but lies outside the mainstream of the social custom literature because psychic 
costs depend on the extent of evasion. They see no reason why such a relation should 
hold. They argue that if the psychic cost is due to the shame at prosecution then the extent 
of evasion is irrelevant. If it is due to the fear of detection, then it should be dependent on 
the detection probability rather than the extent of evasion. Based on the social custom 
literature where it is accepted that once a social custom is broken, all utility from it is 
lost, Myles and Naylor suggest a model in which a social custom utility is derived when 
taxes are paid honestly, but is lost when evasion is undertaken. In their model, taxpayers 
face a choice between evading or not. If a taxpayer chooses evasion, the standard model 
of tax evasion becomes operative. Myles and Naylor combine social customs and social 
conformity with the standard model which represents tax evasion as a choice with risk. 
Since then, further studies have also modeled this puzzle of tax compliance (see, e.g., 
Schnellenbach, 2010).  
 
2. Measurement of Tax Morale 
Several studies have used the World Values Survey (WVS) to generate a proxy for tax 
morale (see Torgler, 2007a). The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of 
socio-cultural  and  political  change  collecting  comparative  data  on  values  and  belief 
systems among people around the world. WVS builds on the European Values Surveys 
(EVS), first carried out in 1981-1984. These surveys have assessed the basic values and 
beliefs  of  people  around  the  world  and  have  been  carried  out  in  about  80  societies 
representing over 80 per cent of the world‘s population. This large data set therefore 
permits cross-country comparison of people‘s tax morale that is based on representative 
national samples The WVS/EVS is particularly advantageous to this review because it 
covers a large set of Central Eastern and Former Soviet Union countries. Not only does 
the WVS/EVS pertain to a wide variety of religions and cultural traditions within each 
country, but it can assist an analysis of value changes over time. The WVS has been 
broadly used by social scientists.  
 
To assess the level of tax morale the following question has been used:   8 
 
―Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between: … Cheating on tax if you have the 
chance‖. The question leads to a ten scale index of tax morale with the two extreme 
points ―never justified‖ and ―always justified‖. 
 
A second important data set that has been used is the Latinobarómetro (Torgler, 2005a). 
It is an annual public opinion survey carried out in 17 Latin American countries (since 
1996).  It  reports  the  opinions,  attitudes,  and  behaviors  of  the  around  400  million 
inhabitants of the region. The survey started with 8 countries in 1995 and was extended to 
17 countries in 1996. It covers most of Latin America with the exception of Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico. This data set is not as well known as the WVS 
though economists have referred to it recently (see, e.g., Graham and Pettinato, 2002, 
who contributed to the happiness research). This data set has integrated a similar question 
which allows to measure tax morale: 
 
―On  a  scale  of  1  to  10,  where  1  means  not  at  all  justifiable  and  10  means  totally 
justifiable, how justifiable do you believe it is to: Manage to avoid paying all his tax‖. 
 
In addition some studies have worked with the International Social Survey Programme 
(ISSP) (see, e.g., Torgler, 2005b). Similar to the previous data sets, it is a continuing 
annual  program  of  cross-national  collaboration.  It  started  in  1983  and  has  grown  to 
include more than 30 nations  (mostly European countries).  The RELIGION  II  (ISSP 
1998) module covers, e.g., the following question: 
 
―Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not report all of his or her 
income in order to pay less income taxes? (1= not wrong, 2= a bit wrong, 3= wrong, 
4=seriously wrong)‖. 
 
In general, these three data sets have the advantage that they are designed as a wide-
ranging survey, which reduces the probability of being suspicious and of creating framing 
effects by other tax context questions.   9 
  Some  studies  have  also  analyzed  the  Taxpayer  Opinion  Survey  (TOS),  data 
collected in the United States in 1987 and providing a broad set of taxpayers‘ opinions 
and evaluations of aspects as the tax system, the Internal Revenue Service, tax evasion, 
cheating  on  taxes  etc.  The  TOS  offers  the  possibility  to  separately  analyze  two 
determinants of tax evasion, overstating of deduction or expenses and underreporting 
income, as dependent variables. Furthermore, it allows for the possibility of developing 
different tax morale variables to check the robustness of the results. Unfortunately, the 
TOS has not been used by many researchers (see, e.g., Smith, 1992; Sheffrin and Triest, 
1992). Even if the data set is quite old, the huge amount of questions and the fact that not 
many papers have used the data set, makes it attractive for newer research projects (see, 
e.g., Forest and Sheffrin, 2002; Torgler, Demir, Macintyre and Schaffner, 2008; Torgler, 
Schaffner, and Macintyre, 2010). Furthermore, the TOS has not been conducted post 
1990.  
In  general,  extracting  only  a  single  question  from  the  WVS  also  reduces 
complexity problems inherent with the construction of an index, especially regarding the 
measurement procedure or a low correlation between the items. Even so, one should 
recognize that there are some good reasons to use a multi-item index instead of a single 
question to measure tax morale.
2 Tax morale is likely to be a multi-dimensional concept, 
which may require a multi -item measurement tool, as in psychometric studies. In this 
context, a single-item measure like ours has some disadvantages comp ared to a multi-
item index (Lewis, 1982; Jackson and Milliron, 1986).  For example, a single -item 
measure may have difficulty in capturing adequately the interrelated facets of tax morale, 
and may also be adversely affected by random errors in measurement.  Further, a multi-
item index has the advantage that errors should tend to average out, therefore producing a 
more reliable measure. Compared to a single -item measure, a multi-item index likely 
provides better score reliability by pooling together informati on that the items have in 
common; a multi-item tool also increases validity by providing a more representative 
sample  of  information  about  the  underlying  concept,  and  it  increases  precision  by 
                                                 
2 For example, Kirchler (1997, 1999) uses several items to measure tax morale.  He confronted subjects 
with various scenarios, in which a fictitious individual overspends/underreports income on a tax return.  
After reading the scenarios, subjects could express their disagreement with or acceptance of tax evasion.   10 
decreasing score variability. Torgler, Schaffner, and Macintyre (2010), e.g., have used an 
index that covers the following questions to be able to measure tax morale: 
1.   Given present tax burdens, one can hardly blame tax evaders. 
2.   Given the easy availability of opportunities to evade taxes, one can hardly 
blame tax evaders. 
3.   If in doubt about whether or not to report a certain source of income, I would 
not report it. 
4.   Since the government gets enough taxes, it does not matter that some people 
evade taxes. 
5.   Taxes are so heavy that tax evasion is an economic necessity for many to 
survive. 
6.   If I receive $2000 in cash for services rendered, I would not report it. 
7.   Cheating on taxes is justifiable in light of the unfairness of the tax system. 
8.   Taxes are something which is taken away from me. 
9.   Since everybody evades taxes, one can hardly be blamed for doing it. 
10. There is nothing bad about under-reporting taxable income on one‘s tax return 
(1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neutral; 4=agree, 5=strongly agree). 
 
In general, single-item  measures in cross-cultural comparisons should be treated with 
some caution.  For example, in countries where tax revenues are collected to finance a 
―dictator‘s war machine‖, tax evasion might be justifiable, and there could even be a 
―moral duty‖ not to pay taxes.  Similarly, in authoritarian political systems people will 
search for ―voice‖ or ―exit‖ mechanisms via tax resistance to express their preferences 
(Torgler, 2001).  Moreover, there is still the potential problem in the survey studies that 
some individuals may excuse their non-cooperative behavior in the past by declaring 
relatively high tax morale values. 
 
3. Correlation between Tax Compliance/Tax Evasion and Tax Morale 
A  number  of  previous  studies  have  investigated  the  simple  correlation  between  tax 
morale and the size of the shadow economy in Western societies, transition countries or 
Latin  America  (Alm  and  Torgler,  2006;  Alm,  Martinez-Vazquez  and  Torgler,  2006, 
Torgler, 2001, 2005a).  These studies report a negative correlation with Pearson r values 
between -0.51 and -0.66. Figures 1 and 2 show the correlation between tax morale in a   11 
country  and the size of the country‘s shadow  economy, using a sample of transition 
countries for which estimates of the informal sector as a percent of official GDP are 
available from Schneider and  Klinglmair (2003).  Figure 1 measures the values based on 
data sets for the years 1999 and 2000.  The results indicate a strong negative correlation 
between both variables (-0.657), significant at the 0.01 level.  In order to increase the 
number of observations, in Figure 2 we include countries that are not included in the 
WVS 1999-2000 but that were part of WVS 1995-1997 (19 observations in total).  We 
observe also in Figure 2 a strong negative correlation (Pearson r = -0.551), significant at 
the 0.01 level.  Thus, transition countries with low tax morale show a clear tendency to 
have a large shadow economy.  Indeed, a simple linear regression in both figures suggests 
that a decrease of tax morale by 1 unit would lead to an increase of the shadow economy 
of roughly 20 percentage points. Moreover, the variable tax morale can explain more than 
30 percent of the total variance of the variable size of shadow economy. 
  However, these analyses give only information about the raw and not the partial 
effects. The observed correlation might be explained in terms of factors that affect the 
size of the shadow economy. It is important to investigate the causes as a whole with 
their  interdependencies.    An  investigation  that  focuses  on  a  simple  correlation  has  a 
somewhat limited validity. Thus, multiple regressions help us to disentangle the effects of 
other factors from a possible tax morale effect. Multivariate studies  indicate that tax 
morale  has  a  very  strong  impact  on  the  size  of  the  shadow  economy  using  a  cross-
sectional and a panel approach (see Torgler and Schneider, 2007a, 2009). 
 
III. HOW IMPORTANT ARE INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 
QUALITY? 
 
1. Theoretical Considerations 
As  Cowell  (1990)  notes,  ―…  the  issue  of  evasion  is,  unlike  other  illegal  activities, 
inseparably bound up with the instruments of fiscal control that the government attempts 
to  use  in  carrying  out  its  economic  policy‖.  While  reducing  evasion  improves  the 
government‘s revenue, it is a broader issue for the development of a civil order (Knack 
and Keefer, 1997).  But, as discussed reducing tax evasion is not simply a matter of   12 
applying higher penalties and/or increasing the frequency of audits.  Extreme penalties 
may backfire by creating a setting in which bribery and corruption are more prevalent and 
the end result may be lower tax compliance and a general loss of trust in the public 
institutions.    Designing  effective  policies  for  reducing  tax  evasion  requires  an 
understanding of the behavioral aspects of the tax compliance decision.  If we find that 
individual  attitudes  toward  compliance  are  a  function  of  social  and  cultural  norms, 
enhancing  these  norms  is  a  desirable  policy  instrument  to  complement  the  usual 
enforcement options.  
Taxation and public finance matters are, in democratic states, resolved through 
political  channels.  History  suggests  that  the  need  to  secure  an  adequate  degree  of 
consensus  has  been  a  principle  driver  behind  the  gradual  (over  centuries)  spread  of 
democratic institutions. In an age of information and mobility, it is not possible for a non-
dictatorial government to stay in power without securing a certain degree of consent from 
the populace in the area of taxation and government activities (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez 
and Torgler, 2008). For example, Lledo, Schneider, and Moore (2003, p. 47) stress, the 
key problem in Latin America is that most countries lack ―…an (implicit) social contract 
between governments and the general populace of the kind that is embedded in taxation 
and fiscal principles and practices in politically more stable parts of the world‖. 
State legitimacy thus rests to a considerable extent on citizens‘ ―quasi-voluntary 
compliance‖ (Levi, 1988). Tyler‘s research (1990a, 1990b, 1997) provides support for the 
importance of legitimacy and allegiance to authority in compliance decisions. The way 
people  are  treated  by  the  authorities  affects  their  evaluations  of  authorities  and  their 
willingness to co-operate. Tyler (1997) argues that understanding what people want in a 
legal procedure helps to explain public dissatisfaction with the law and points towards 
directions  for  building  public  support  for  the  law  in  the  future.  To  secure  such 
compliance, the government system must, over time, represent the basic values of at least 
a minimum supporting  coalition of the population. In other words, it is not only the 
economic,  but  also  the  political  system  that  affects  formal  and  informal  economic 
activities. The general performance in many countries may be explained by underlying 
political conditions. The political equilibrium position reflects the balance of political 
forces and institutions (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler, 2006). Taxes are the price   13 
paid  for  government  services  and  taxpayers  generally  are  sensitive  to  the  way  the 
government uses tax revenues.  Therefore, taxpayers perceive their relationship with the 
state not only as a relationship of coercion, but also as one of exchange.  Individuals will 
feel cheated if taxes are not spent efficiently.  If citizens perceive that their interests 
(preferences)  are  properly  represented  in  political  institutions  and  they  receive  an 
adequate supply of public goods, their identification with the state increases alongside 
their willingness to contribute.  On the other hand, an inefficient state where corruption is 
rampant will spawn citizens  with  little trust  in authority and thus  a low incentive to 
cooperate. In other words, a more encompassing and legitimate state increases citizens‘ 
willingness to contribute.  Such a state may tend to increase taxpayers‘ positive attitudes 
and  commitment  to  the  tax  system,  with  an  accompanying  positive  effect  on  tax 
compliance (see, e.g., Smith, 1992). Hayoz and Hug (2007, p. 10) stress: ―The state being 
considered  as  a  part  of  the  community  and  not  as  the  hostile  other  or  ―they‖  can 
reasonably expect to secure tax compliance. This is also true about governance, about 
citizen participation in the management of the rules of the game. In some regions of 
Eastern Europe such experiences were never made: here a ―culture of distrust‖ imply also 
a  ―culture  of  tax  evasion‖.  The  more  people  are  involved  in  establishing  rules,  the 
stronger is their sense of obligation (Kidder and McEwen, 1989; Cialdini, 1989; McEwen 
and  Maiman,  1986;  Lempert,  1972).  There  are  various  tax  compliance  studies  that 
indicate, e.g., that giving individuals the chance to vote on setting the rules increases 
compliance  (Alm,  Jackson  and  McKee,  1993;  Feld  and  Tyran,  2002;  Torgler  and 
Schaltegger, 2005). Voting procedure and public discussions prior to votes, creates a 
sense of civic duty, as taxpayers become aware of the importance to contribute to public 
goods.  Voting  possibilities  also  provide  utility  in  itself.  Citizens  value  the  right  to 
participate,  because  it  produces  a  kind  of  procedural  utility  as  the  opportunity  set 
increases. It leads to an outcome (acceptance of the amnesty or not) more favourable 
compared to the situation where no such voting possibility exists. 
If the government and the administration have a great discretionary power over 
the allocation of resources, corruption is enhanced where the rulers are non-benevolent. A 
sustainable tax system is based on a fair tax system and responsive government, achieved 
with a strong connection between tax payments and the supply of public goods (Bird et   14 
al., 2006). Agents such as the political elite, administration staff, and legislators wield 
discretionary power if institutions are neither credible nor working well. This has the 
negative consequence that citizens lose their trust in the authority. In countries where 
corruption is systemic and the government budget lacks transparency and accountability 
the  obligation  of  paying  taxes  cannot  be  assumed  to  be  an  accepted  social  norm. 
Institutional instability, lack of transparency and rule of law undermine the willingness of 
frustrated citizens to be active in the formal economy. Furthermore, there might be a 
crowding-out  effect  of  morality among the tax administrators when there are  a  great 
number  of  corrupt  colleagues.  Moreover,  regulatory  restraints  and  bureaucratic 
procedures not only limit competition and the operation of markets, but also provide a 
better foundation for corrupt activities. If individuals and businesses believe that neither 
contracts will be enforced nor productive efforts protected, their incentive to be active in 
the shadow economy increases. Citizens will feel cheated if they believe that corruption 
is widespread, their tax burden is not spent well, their government lacks accountability, 
and that they are not protected by the rules of law.  
 
2. Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Institutions, Governance and Tax Reforms  
Frey and Torgler (2007) explore the determinants of tax morale in Eastern and Western 
Europe using the European Values Survey (EVS) 1999/2000. The study covers a large set 
of countries
3 using a micro data set at the individual level (covering more than 32‘000 
observations). To investigate whether institutional quality matters they use six proxies of 
the governance indicators developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004). The 
variables  measure  the  process  by  which  governments  are  selected,  monitored,  and 
replaced  (voice  and  accountability,  political  stability  and  absence  of  violence),  the 
capacity  of  the  government  to  formulate  and  implement  sound  policies  (government 
effectiveness,  regulatory  quality)  and  the  respect  of  citizens  and  the  state  for  the 
institutions  that  govern  economic  and  social  interactions  (rule  of  law  and  control  of 
corruption).  All  scores  estimated  by  Kaufmann,  Kraay,  and  Mastruzzi  (2004)  range 
                                                 
3  Eastern  European  countries  (Belarus,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Greece,  Hungary, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Romania,  Russia,  Slovak  Republic,  Ukraine),  Western  European  countries 
(Austria,  Belgium,  Great  Britain,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Italy,  Malta, 
Netherlands, North Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden).    15 
between –2.5 and 2.5 with higher scores corresponding to better institutions or outcomes. 
Table A1 in the Appendix provides a summary of the 12 regression results focusing only 
on the institutional coefficients. In all estimations, the coefficients of the institutional 
variables  have  a  statistically  significant  positive  effect  on  tax  morale.  The  strongest 
quantitative effects  are observable for voice and accountability, political stability and 
regulatory quality. For example, an increase in the voice and accountability scale by one 
unit  increases  the  probability  of  stating  that  tax  evasion  is  never  justified  by  7.5 
percentage  points.  Frey  and  Torgler  (2007)  also  explored  the  relationship  between 
vertical trust (trust between taxpayers and the state). Trust in the state may influence the 
willingness to pay taxes but it is not necessarily related to conditional cooperation among 
the citizens. Smith (1992) shows that positive actions by the state are intended to improve 
taxpayers‘  attitudes  and  their  commitment  to  the  tax  system  and  lead  to  compliant 
behavior. If the state acts in a trustworthy way, taxpayers are more willing to comply 
with taxes. To check for robustness, Frey and Torgler (2007) use two trust variables: trust 
in the justice system and trust in the parliament. These variables allow them to analyze 
trust at the constitutional level, e.g., trust in the legal system, thereby focusing on how the 
relationship between the state and its citizens is established. This also allows them to 
analyze  trust  more  closely  at  the  current  politico-economic  level,  e.g.,  trust  in  the 
parliament. In addition, they analyze the impact on tax morale of individuals‘ satisfaction 
with the way democracy is developing in a country, namely satisfaction with democracy. 
In general, a government that pre-commits to democratic rules imposes restraints on its 
own power and thus signals its willingness to  treat  taxpayers as responsible persons. 
Strong  democratic  rules  indicate  that  citizens  are  not  perceived  to  be  ignorant  or 
uncomprehending voters, which may create or maintain social capital stock. If taxpayers 
think they are in a better position to monitor and control politicians, their willingness to 
pay  taxes  and  cooperate  increases.  Therefore,  a  higher  degree  of  satisfaction  with  a 
country‘s democratic institution should lead to higher tax morale. The results indicate 
that these factors have statistically significant positive effect on tax morale. For example, 
an increase in  trust  in  the justice system  or in  the parliament  by one  unit raises the 
percentage of persons reporting the highest tax morale by more than 3 percentage points. 
Similarly, a one-unit increase in satisfaction with the way democracy is developing raises   16 
the proportion of persons stating that tax evasion is never justified by 1.5 percentage 
points. These findings demonstrate the relevance of institutions that enhance political 
participation and trust in the parliament and the justice system. Such institutions have 
beneficial effects on social capital and the political outcome not only in Western Europe 
but also in Eastern Europe as Frey (2003a) shows. 
Torgler and Schneider (2007a, 2009) show that that improving governance and 
institutional quality and tax morale helps lessen a possible incentive to go underground. 
The results are quite robust using more than 25 proxies of governance and institutional 
quality, testing for endogeneity and running a broad variety of specifications. Table 1 
provides an overview of the results. Working with a survey done in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, Hungary, and Poland, Hanousek and Palda (2004) find strong support that 
there is a positive correlation between tax evasion and the perceived government services 
based on the taxes paid. 
If institutions affect tax morale and the shadow economy, it may be worthwhile to 
explore also its impact on tax performance. The level of tax performance is related to the 
availability of what may be called the ―exit option‖ of the so-called shadow economy.  In 
general, the larger the shadow economy, the lower we would expect tax effort to be.  
Hence, one can measure the extent of tax effort to discover whether institutional quality 
(measured by corruption and voice and accountability) affects that behavior. In other 
words, it may be important to explore not only traditional variables such as tax burden, 
the sectoral composition, the richness of a country or the labor market conditions - but 
also institutional and governance quality. The more taxpayers believe that others work in 
the shadow economy, the lower the moral costs of behaving dishonestly and evading 
taxes by moving their own activities to the shadow economy. In this way the potential 
intrinsic motivation to comply and contribute to public sector activities gets crowded out. 
This relationship has been shown empirically by Bird et al. (2006). Public finance matters 
are usually resolved through political channels, hence, as mentioned previously, history 
suggests that the need to secure an adequate degree of consensus from the taxed is one of 
the principal ways in which democratic institutions have spread. A better political system 
is more interested in providing citizens what they want, and it transmutes individuals‘ and 
firms‘ preferences into policy decisions in a more efficient manner (Bird et al., 2008).   17 
Moreover, Kaufmann et al. (2004) stress that ―corruption is often a manifestation of a 
lack of respect of both the corrupter (typically a private citizen or firm) and the corrupted 
(typically a public official or politician) for the rules that govern their interactions, and 
hence represents a failure of governance according to our definition‖ (p.  255).  If the 
formal economy does not represent the preferences of the citizens, the resulting loss of 
respect may increase participation in underground activities. Johnson, Kaufmann, and 
Shleifer (1997) model the shadow economy as a substitute for the official economy, from 
the  assumption  that  individuals  are  mutually  exclusively  employed  in  the  official 
economy and the shadow economy. If more people are in the shadow economy, this 
reduces the tax revenue and reduces the money available for public goods or institutional 
reform, which increases the returns to participation in the shadow economy. The erosion 
of  the  tax  base  by  the  size  of  the  shadow  economy  might  reduce  the  ability  of  the 
government to make effective policy (Dreher et al., 2009). Katsios (2006) observes this 
effect in Greece, where the inability to tax the underground economy weakens the ability 
of  the  government  to  stabilize  and  manage  the  economy.  This  can  increase  social 
problems which might decrease social capital and trust in the economy, which can lead to 
further deterioration of institutional conditions. Dreher and Schneider (2010, p. 6) state 
that ―better institutional quality… increases the benefits entrepreneurs can derive from 
operating in the official sector…‖; reduces the shadow economy, and ―… should thus 
reduce  corruption  and  the  size  of  the  shadow  economy  alike‖.  Once  operations  are 
transferred  to  the  shadow  economy,  the  entrepreneur  can  no  longer  benefit  from  the 
public goods available in the formal economy (Choi and Thum, 2005, p. 829). However, 
the value of those public goods will depend on the level of corruption, as the greater the 
level of corruption, the lower the tax effort, and hence the lower the resources available 
for public goods.  
 The issue of low tax effort in developing countries has been quite relevant in 
Latin America and lessons can be learned for transition countries. Over the last forty 
years, most Latin American countries found it difficult to achieve a sustainable policy 
balance given the often conflicting and frequently changing forces, external and internal, 
economic and political, they have faced. It is thus not surprising that their tax policies 
have changed considerably over this period-- though much less in either level or structure   18 
than  might  have  been  expected.  Indeed,  it  may  be  that  countries  tend  to  achieve  an 
equilibrium position with respect to the size and nature of their fiscal systems that largely 
reflects  the balance of  political  forces  and institutions,  and stay at  this  position until 
‗shocked‘ to a new equilibrium (Bird et al., 2008). An interesting case is, e.g., Mexico 
(see  Bird  et  al.  2006).  Martinez-Vazquez  (2001)  notes  that  one  of  the  most  striking 
features of the various major tax changes that have taken place over the decades has been 
how very little apparent effect they have had on Mexico‘s tax-GDP ratio, which has 
remained almost constant. Tax policy and tax administration reforms over the last two 
decades have given Mexico a tax structure that is in many ways comparable to that in 
many developed countries but the tax system has continued to perform poorly in raising 
adequate revenues. The management of tax policy seemed to have been a crucial element. 
The good fundamental structure of Mexico‘s tax system and its revenue performance has 
been  undermined  by  numerous  ad  hoc  policy  measures.  With  respect  to  the  tax  on 
enterprise profits, several economic sectors benefited from a special regime in which the 
tax base was calculated on a cash-flow basis. Agriculture and some other sectors also 
benefited  from  substantial  lower  tax  rates.  These  and  many  other  exceptions  to  the 
supposedly  general  income and sales taxes  added excess  burdens,  cost  revenues,  and 
undermined the confidence of taxpayers in the fairness of the system. The summation of 
these  impacts  is  likely  to  have  reduced  voluntary  compliance  in  the  system.  Tax 
administration in Mexico has also faltered because tax policy measures have ignored the 
ability of the tax administration to enforce complex tax issues, and in part because the tax 
administration  has  failed  to  modernize  (and  may  in  some  respects  even  have  gone 
backwards with respect to some of the institutional improvements achieved in earlier 
periods). In sum, it appears that reforms in tax structure (1) may have been undermined 
by  unrelated  ad  hoc  measures,  or  (2)  they  may  have  been  offset  by  administrative 
deterioration. Similar relative constancy can be seen in other countries (e.g. Colombia) 
over the decades despite repeated tax reforms (McLure and Zodrow, 1997). Bird et al. 
(2006) stress  that a ―good tax reform‖ is  comparable to  a  ―good‘ seat  belt law‖.   If 
everything else stayed the same, lives can be saved (the tax ratio would increase), but 
things do not stay the same leading  some people to drive faster when they are belted in, 
so death rates (tax ratios) may show little change.   19 
Bird et al. (2006) measure tax effort as tax revenue as a share of gross domestic 
product (GDP). Data for both measures of the dependent variable came from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI). The model was estimated using cross-section data with 
mean values for the years 1990 to 1999 for 110 transitional and developing countries.
4 
Table  A2  in  the  Appendix  presents  a  summary  of  the  results.  It  can  be  seen  that 
institutions and governance play a significant role in the determination of the level of tax 
effort in transition and developing countries using the Kaufmann et al. (2004) data set 
and the International Country Risk Guide database. The ICRG provides an alternative set 
of data to the Quality of Governance Index, with special emphasis on aspects affecting 
private foreign investment decisions.  The data contain annual values for indicators of the 
quality of governance, constructed by Stephen Knack and the IRIS Center, University of 
Maryland, and provided by The PRS Group. The results indicate the institutional factors 
are always statistically significant at the 1% level with substantial quantitative effects. 
Using panel data Torgler et al. (2010) extend the previous studies covering a time period 
of 16 years using the ICRG risk guide data (1990-2005). They also implemented the 
Kaufmann et al. (2006) data set working with the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 
2004.  Such  an  analysis  goes  beyond  the  previous  studies  that  have  explored  this 
framework, mainly in a cross-sectional environment (e.g., Bird et al. 2006, 2008). Their 
results also indicate that governance and institutional conditions have a strong impact on 
tax performance. 
  Looking at further factors and focusing more on tax administration using US and 
data from Turkey, Torgler, Demir, Macintyre and Schaffner (2008) report that positive 
attitudes towards the tax authority (e.g., how taxpayers rated tax administrations‘ job, 
their honesty and fairness, and their helping and information behavior) and tax system 
significantly  increase  tax  morale.  As  Smith  (1992)  argues,  ―cycles  of  antagonism 
between the tax administration and the taxpayer might begin to break with a positive 
concession  by  the  administrator‖  (p.  226).  He  points  out  that  a  respectful  and  fair 
treatment of taxpayers induces respect for the tax system and thus leads to co-operation. 
On the other hand, a higher perceived tax burden crowds out the intrinsic motivation to 
pay taxes.  Interestingly, complexity does not have a significant effect on tax morale, 
                                                 
4 The use of average values over a period allows maximizing the number of observations.     20 
while  the  awareness  of  tax  issues  correlates  with  lower  tax  morale.  However,  the 
coefficient was not significant in all cases. Trust in public officials, the state and other 
people  has  a  highly  significant  positive  effect  on  tax  morale.  Similarly,  a  higher 
perceived level of corruption decreases the willingness to contribute. Moreover, a higher 
sense of obedience and religiosity lead to a higher tax morale.  
  Torgler and Murphy (2004) report a strong increase of tax morale in Australia 
during the 1980s and 1990s. In early 1980s, the government faced numerous complaints 
about  the  existing  income  tax  system  (Smith,  1993).  There  was  prevalent  perception 
amongst the public that many were not meeting their taxation obligations and it was clear 
that  taxpayer  compliance  had  eroded.  ―Tax  evasion  was  also  contributing  to  public 
resentment towards the existing and highly visible income tax burden‖ (Smith, 1993, p. 
111). For example, during the late 1970s, the scandalous ―bottom of the harbor‖ schemes 
were being widely publicized. Here, company profits were being stripped before they 
could be taxed and the records conveniently lost (Levi, 1988). The more widespread the 
knowledge that others were not paying their share, the more non-compliance increased.  
As a consequence taxation reform was a prominent issue to taxpayers during the mid to 
late 1980s, and the reforms ―substantially improved the fairness of the tax system at the 
time‖ (Mathews,  1985,  p. 424).   In the 1986/87  financial  year, the ATO (Australian 
Taxation  Office)  introduced  a  self-assessment  system  to  taxation.  As  discussed  by 
D‘Ascenzo  and  Poulakis  (2002)  the  move  to  a  self-assessment  system  came  about 
following  an  ATO  review  of  the  effectiveness  of  its  traditional  system  of  assessing 
income tax returns. The ATO review concluded that the original assessment system was 
not  cost  effective  and  had  little  effect  on  taxpayer  compliance.  Not  only  is  the  self-
assessment  system  of taxation a more cost  effective system  for the  ATO, but  if one 
reviews the literature on regulatory theory, such a system is what regulatory scholars call 
a  self-regulatory  system.  Regulatory  scholars  (e.g.,  Ayres  and  Braithwaite,  1992; 
Sparrow,  2000)  consistently  argue  that  if  those  being  regulated  are  allowed  to  self-
regulate  themselves  in  the  first  instance,  then  this  serves  to  improve  their  voluntary 
compliance in the long-term.  This is because self-regulation is important for building and 
maintaining trust among regulators and regulatees. Several empirical studies have been 
able  to  show  that  trust  can  serve  to  nurture  voluntary  compliance  (e.g.,  Ayres  and   21 
Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite and Makkai, 1994; Torgler, 2007a). Trust appears to be a 
resource  like  no  other;  it  is  not  depleted  through  use  but  rather  through  lack  of  use 
(Gambetta, 1988). Hence, the more that regulatory interactions are based on trust, the 
more likely regulators such as the ATO should be able to nurture the development of 
reciprocal trust relationships. Of course, for such a system to be sustainable long-term, it 
also requires that a backup strategy be in place to detect and penalize those who may 
attempt to cheat the system (hence, the purpose of post-assessment audits and penalties 
for illegitimate returns).  Moreover, the 1980s saw public administration being faced with 
growing  state  and  public  demands  to  become  more  market-focused,  service  oriented, 
open and efficient (Job and Honaker, 2003; Hughes, 1994). To respond to this, the ATO 
adopted  a  new  organizational  structure  designed  to  make  them  more  efficient  and 
customer-focused.  Instead of focusing so much on compliance management, risk control, 
or structuring the application of enforcement discretion, the ATO slowly became more 
focused on service, customers, quality, transparency and process improvement (see Job 
and Honaker, 2003).  In fact, the ATO was amongst the first tax administrations in the 
world to implement a new client-based organizational structure (the client based model is 
where staff members are assigned to units that focus on specific groups of customers; for 
example, salary and wage earners, small business income taxpayers, and large business 
income tax payers)
5.  One of the advantages of such a client -based structure is that it 
allows tax administrations to better match their enforcement and educational programs to 
the compliance patterns of different groups (Vehorn and Brondolo, 1999). According to 
Verhorn and Brondolo (1999, p. 505), such a system has  ―the potential for delivering 
higher quality service to taxpayers and achieving high levels of compliance―. If taxpayers 
feel  that such an approach is  likely to  achieve better compliance levels  among other 
taxpayers, then this may go on to influence their own tax morale.  Such a client-focused 
approach is also likely to increase trust among taxpayers, as taxpayers are more likely to 
feel that their needs are being considered in the regulatory process.   
  Another example is Japan. The country had to be reorganized after World War II. 
In 1949 the National Tax Agency (NTA) was established and a self-assessment system 
                                                 
5 Prior to this, a function-based structure was used by the ATO (e.g., a separate division for processing tax 
returns, another for auditing taxpayers, and another for collecting areas).    22 
for the main taxes was introduced signaling trust in taxpayers (Okada, 2002). Usui (2002, 
p. 6) reports that in 1948 around 70 percent of the taxpayers who were required to fill-out 
the tax return had made filling mistakes or had not filled the returns at all. The percentage 
of  tax  delinquency  exceeded  40  percent.  After  continues  reforms  tax  compliance 
improved. Okada (2002) points out that at the tax agency made great efforts to provide 
the public with tax information via television, radio, internet and newspapers, distributing 
pamphlets and booklets and organizing every November a ―Know-Your-Tax‖ (p. 2) with 
round-table  discussions  and  essay  competitions  for  students  about  taxation.  It  is 
interesting to see how taxpayers are treated by the tax administration. If taxpayers make 
obvious errors they are informed and the result of the examination is explained to them, 
to make them understand the errors. Such procedures indicate that the tax administration 
in Japan tries to be fair to the taxpayers. Institutions and procedures taxpayers perceive as 
fair and efficient might have a positive effect on tax morale. Okada (2002) also gives a 
broad survey on training programs for tax administrators. The central organization is the 
National Tax College (NTC) including 12 branches nationwide, which work together 
with academics, among them, many university professors, giving lectures at the college. 
Such a structure shows that Japan, contrary to its Asian counterparts, invests substantial 
efforts into developing a highly trained tax administration. Furthermore, the salaries of 
the tax administrators according to Okada (2002) are slightly higher than for officials 
engaged in other government sections, which are paid at a level comparable to the private 
sector. This reduces the incentive for tax officials to demand bribes. Focusing on Asia, 
Torgler  (2004)  observes  that  Japan  has  relatively  high  tax  morale  values  within  the 
region. 
Feld and Frey (2002a) using a data set of tax authorities‘ behavior in Switzerland 
(26 cantonal tax authorities), they find that tax authorities of cantons with more direct 
participation rights treat taxpayers more respectfully and are less suspicious if taxpayers 
report too low incomes than the authorities in cantons with less direct democracy. On the 
other  hand,  non-submissions  of  tax  declarations  attract  heavier  fines.  Feld  and  Frey 
(2002b) continue using this framework and argue that tax morale is supported or even 
raised when tax officials treat taxpayers with respect and on the other hand is reduced 
when the administration considers taxpayers as individuals who have to be forced to pay   23 
the taxes: ―The feeling of being controlled in a negative way, and being suspected of tax 
cheating, tends to crowd out the intrinsic motivation to act as an honorable taxpayers and, 
as a consequence, tax morale will fall. In contrast, if the tax official makes an effort to 
find out  the  reason  for  the error by  contacting  the taxpayer in an informal way, the 
taxpayer will appreciate this respectful treatment and tax morale will be upheld‖ (p. 4). 
They divide respectful treatment, by the tax administration into two components (p. 5): 
(i) transparent and clear procedure, (ii) respecting taxpayers‘ character. Their empirical 
analysis shows that treating taxpayers respectfully reduces tax evasion. 
  Alm and Torgler (2006) combine a large number of Western European countries 
into an empirical study using multiple regression analysis.  They differentiated between 
Romanic and Northern Countries. The results indicate that people from Northern Europe 
possess  higher  tax  morale  than  people  from  Southern  Europe.    The  marginal  effects 
indicate that being from a Romanic country rather than from Northern Europe reduces the 
probability  of  stating  that  tax  evasion  is  never  justified  by  1.3  percentage  points. 
Similarly,  Weck  (1983),  Weck,  Pommerehne,  and  Frey  (1984),  and  Frey  and  Weck-
Hannemann  (1984)  use  cross-country  survey  results  for  the  years  1960,  1965,  1970, 
1975, and 1978 in order to develop an aggregate, country-level ―tax immorality‖ index 
for various countries. Their index indicates that Romanic countries have a higher tax 
immorality than most other countries.  In this context, Kirchgässner (1999) argues that 
state and religious authority were largely held by one person in the northern states of 
Europe (in contrast to the majority of Catholic countries in the south).  Offenses against 
the  state  were  therefore  also  religious  offenses  and  consequently  a  sin.    Torgler  and 
Schneider (2007b) looking at Switzerland, Spain and Belgium observe that cultural and 
regional  differences  within  a  country  also  affect  tax  morale  in  both  Switzerland  and 
Spain. 
Looking at Europe and the US, Alm and Torgler (2006) also find that the highest 
tax morale is observed in the United States and in Switzerland, two countries with very 
strong direct democratic traditions. Taxpayers are treated as ―citizens‖ with extensive 
rights and obligations (Frey, 2003b).  The possibility of taxpayers voting on fiscal issues, 
and thereby being involved directly in the political decision process might enhance their 
sense of civic duty (Feld and Frey, 2002a) and thus their tax morale.  The instrument of   24 
direct democracy helps spend taxes according to citizen preferences, and the motivation 
to pay taxes may increase. Such results are similar to some previous findings.  Two 
studies have explored Switzerland due the fact that the level of direct democracy varies 
among the 26 cantons. Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996) use cross-section/time 
series regressions with Swiss data and find that tax evasion is lower in cantons with a 
higher degree of direct political control. Torgler (2005b) also finds with Swiss survey 
data that a higher direct democracy leads to a higher tax morale. Looking at papers on 
voting and tax compliance, Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1999), Feld and Tyran (2002) 
and Torgler and Schaltegger (2005) use experimental methods, and show that voting on 
tax issues  has  a positive effect  on tax compliance. Moreover, more recently the link 
between local autonomy and tax morale and tax compliance has been analyzed (Torgler, 
Schneider and Schaltegger, 2010). The advantage of smaller structures in tax policy is 
that  citizens‘  preferences  are  able  to  be  better  served  than  in  a  framework  where  a 
uniform  tax  system  is  designed  for  a  population  with  heterogeneous  preferences. 
Moreover,  there  is  an  intensive  everyday  interaction  between  taxpayers  and  local 
politicians and bureaucrats. This closeness between taxpayers, the tax administration and 
the  local  government  may  induce  trust  and  thus  enhance  tax  morale.  Politicians  and 
members of the administration are better informed about the preferences of the local 
population. Furthermore, there is a politico-institutional aspect: if politicians are elected 
at the local level, they have an incentive to take the preferences of their constituency into 
account and thus to spend the local tax revenues according to local preferences (see Frey 
and Eichenberger, 1999). Decentralization brings the government closer to the people. 
Many economists point out the relevance of giving sub-national governments the taxing 
power (see, e.g., Bahl, 1999). One of the strengths of a decentralized system is greater 
transparency  between  the  tax  price  and  the  public  services  received.  Taxes  are 
comparable to prices in some sense, especially at the local level (Blankart, 2002). Even 
the (progressive) income tax is a good instrument for a local structure. It is always under 
individuals‘ test, providing citizens the opportunity to use the instruments of exit and 
voice (see Hirschman, 1970). The mechanism of fiscally induced migration in federal 
states provides a strong incentive to provide public services in accordance to taxpayers‘ 
preferences.  Moreover  federalism  and  local  autonomy  is  connected  to  innovation.   25 
Federalism  serves  as  a  laboratory  for  policy  inventions  (Oates,  1999).  Looking  at 
Switzerland, at the cantonal level, evaluating the impact of federalism on tax morale and 
the  size  of  the  shadow  economy,  Torgler,  Schneider  and  Schaltegger  (2010)  provide 
evidence that a higher level of local autonomy is correlated with higher tax morale and a 
lower shadow economy. 
 
3. Evidence from Developing Countries: The Case of South Africa and Botswana 
Further insights that might be relevant for transition countries might be derived from 
comparative evidence in developing countries, under a relatively controlled environment. 
Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee and Torgler (2009) have compared Botswana and 
South  Africa.  Both  countries  have  experienced  strikingly  different  social  histories, 
despite  being  neighbors.  Thus,  these  countries  offer  a  natural  experiment  for  the 
investigation of the effects  of tax morale stemming from  perceptions  of government.  
Analyses  of  data  from  surveys  of  public  attitudes  toward  government  show  that 
perceptions of government fairness and efficacy are considerably higher in Botswana and 
self-reported tax compliance appears to be higher as well.  Using controlled laboratory 
experiments Cummings et al. (2009) are able to confirm that these reported differences in 
tax  attitudes  can  be  explained  by  social  norms.    In  the  experiments,  the  same  tax 
reporting and enforcement regimes were imposed in sessions conducted in both countries.  
Given  the  experimental  control,  the  authors  argue  that  observed  differences  in 
compliance  behavior  are  the  result  of  differing  social  norms.  Similarities  in  the  tax 
systems  allow employment  of the same jargon in  each country, and since English  is 
widely used in both countries, the authors were able to conduct the experiments in a 
common language. These facilitate comparisons of tax compliance behavior across these 
otherwise widely divergent countries. Their laboratory experiments were conducted in 
the fall of 1999 and the survey data were collected during 1999 – 2000. 
We have seen in the previous part of the report that tax compliance not only 
depends  on  enforcement  effort,  but  also  on  the  inhibitors  that  are  inherent  in  the 
individual-government  relationships.  For  the  personal  income  tax  (PIT),  the  self-
assessment and audit processes are similar in both countries although there are varying 
degrees  of  aggressiveness  in  enforcement.  Both  countries  rely  on  some  form  of   26 
withholding during the year and individual self-assessment and reporting of final  tax 
liabilities.  Tax evasion is treated as a serious crime in South Africa; the tax authority 
exploits high profile cases to reinforce its reputation for tough enforcement.
6  The South 
Africa Revenue Service (SARS) has a policy of not revealing the audit rules or penalties.  
In Botswana, on the other hand, the attitude of the tax authority seems to be more 
accommodating.  For example, a general tax amnesty was conducted in 1999.  Thi s was 
yet to occur in South Africa during conduct of the present study. 
The respective computations of the tax bases are quite similar in South Africa and 
Botswana.  In South Africa, the PIT base consists of wages and salaries as well as passive 
income (e.g., interest and dividends) but not capital gains. In Botswana, the PIT base 
includes wages and salaries as well as all investment income (interest, dividends, and 
capital gains).  In Botswana the marginal rate is capped at 25 percent, which is lower than 
the  rates  in  South  Africa  (45  percent)  and  other  neighboring  countries.  Various 
exemptions and deductions (but no dependent deduction s) are offered in Botswana.  
Thus,  there  are  substantial  differences  across  the  countries  in  terms  of  maximum 
marginal  rates.  In  Botswana,  the  investigative  division  carries  out  in -depth  case 
examination where tax evasion is suspected.  Civil penalties can be imposed for failure to 
file if taxes are owed.  These penalties consist of interest at the rate of two percent per 
month and a penalty not to exceed the tax owed.  Criminal penalties not to exceed one 
year can be imposed for egregious evasion and or fraud.  In South Africa the penalty 
structure is generally harsher.  Any person required to file a return who fails to do so 
within the period mentioned above, is liable to a penalty not exceeding R2,000 and/or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding twelve months.  Further, his/her taxable income 
may be estimated and three times the amount of tax charged thereon.  Any taxpayer who 
knowingly and willfully makes any false statement in his/her return or evades or attempts 
to evade taxation and any person who assists a taxpayer to do so, is liable to a penalty not 
exceeding R1,000 and/or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding  two years.  The 
taxpayer is, in addition, liable to be assessed and charged three times the amount of the 
tax, which he/she sought to evade. 
                                                 
6 About the time of our experiments, a South African newspaper article reported that Bishop Desmond 
Tutu‘s son Trevor was sentenced to 12 months in jail for tax evasion (The Star, October 28, 1999 p 6, 
Johannesburg, SA).   27 
The level of sophistication of the tax enforcement apparatus differs considerably 
between Botswana and South Africa.  SARS implemented a modern computerized tax 
collections and administration monitoring system in 1997, which was hoped to improve 
data integrity, reduce human intervention, and increase effectiveness and productivity.  
Botswana‘s  tax  administration  system  is  evolving  but  enjoys  less  resources.    Both 
countries take steps to associate taxation with the provision of government services.  For 
example, the tax legislation of South Africa explicitly states, ―taxes are not a punishment, 
they are the price paid for government services‖. 
A comparison of tax morale in Botswana and South Africa is certainly natural.  
Although geographic neighbors, the social histories of the two countries could not differ 
more.  Botswana‘s  political  history  is  virtually  unique  among  African  countries.  
Although  it  was  a  colony  (British)  and  only  recently  (1966)  gained  independence, 
diamond-rich  Botswana  is  one  of  Africa's  oldest  multiparty  democracies  and  has 
successfully  transitioned  to  self-governance.    Several  elections  have  been  held  since 
independence and all have been quiet affairs with none of the violence or corruption 
charges  that  have  accompanied  elections  in  neighboring  countries.    In  fact,  the 
government of Botswana takes great pride in its stability and refers to itself as the ―gem 
of Africa‖ in many official publications.  A message is clear: the government is working 
for you – paying taxes constitutes part of this social contract. Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson  (2002)  report  that  pre-colonial  tribal  institutions  developed  by  the  Tswana 
tribes, encouraged cooperation and participation and helped to constrain political elites.  
The Botswana experience is in marked contrast with South Africa with its well-known 
history of apartheid and social discord.  Indeed elections in South Africa held prior to our 
period of analysis have been controversial and often accompanied by violence.  Both the 
white and black populations have reason to be suspicious of the government.  The white 
population has been concerned about protection of property rights (especially in the face 
of proposals for land reform) while the black population has little reason to trust any 
government until it has been demonstrated that such trust is warranted.  The political 
history of South Africa has been conflictive with the government struggling to establish 
trust. Crime rates are very high (one of the highest in the world, in fact) and there is a   28 
feeling that the social order is somewhat fragile, although, the government has recently 
undertaken steps to address these sentiments. 
Table  A3  provides  detailed  institutional  comparisons.  Transparency 
International‘s  Corruption  Perception  Index,  which  relates  corruption  perceptions  of 
various countries‘ government, indicates considerable differences between Botswana and 
South Africa: Botswana‘s score is some 20 percent higher (better) than South Africa‘s.  
These results are consistent with the Quality of Governance Index provided by Kaufmann 
et  al.  (2004).  Botswana  has  higher  control  of  corruption  values  than  South  Africa.  
Similarly, the Rule of Law Index, which measures the degree of agents‘ confidence in 
and  compliance  with  social  rules,  is  more  than  three  times  larger  in  Botswana.  
Consequently,  the  respect  of  citizens  for  the  state  and  the  institutions  that  govern 
economic and social interactions is higher in Botswana.  The capacity of the government 
to effectively formulate and implement sound policies (represented as the government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality) is higher in Botswana, which also has a higher level 
of political stability and absence of violence.  Only voice and accountability are higher in 
South Africa, referring to the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced.  Overall, the values of these six governance dimensions for the periods 1998 
and 2000 clearly indicate a higher level of institutional quality in Botswana compared to 
South Africa.  These results are also supported by the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). Table A3 also shows that political rights and the level of civil liberty are similar 
in  both  countries.  To  measure  the  variable  income  inequality  –  we  use  the  newest 
available  data  set,  Estimated  Household  Income  Inequality  (EHII),  constructed  by 
Galbraith and Kum (2005)
7.  The GINI coefficients indicate that i ncome inequality is 
slightly greater in Botswana.  The Index of Economic Freedom clearly indicates a higher 
fiscal burden
8 for South Africa, but also less government interventions in South Africa.  
The Polity IV data set shows, in line with previous data s ets, that Botswana has more 
                                                 
7 Galbraith and Kum (2005) estimate gross household income inequality from a regression between the 
Deininger and Squire (1996) inequality measures and the UTIP-UNIDO pay inequality measures.  
8 The index of fiscal burden measures the burden a government imposes on its citizens. The following 
variables have been integrated in the index: top income tax rate, tax rate an average taxpayer faces, top 
corporate tax rate and government expenditures measured as a percentage of GDP. To get the index, the 
scores of the income tax rate and the corporate tax rate are measured separately and then averaged to get a 
single taxation score. The final score for the fiscal burden consist s of the averaged scores for income and 
corporate taxation and for government expenditures.   29 
stable political institutions than South Africa. Some studies have shown tendencies exists 
for ethnic fractionalization to negatively influence economic success and the quality of 
institutions (see, e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 
2003).  Easterly and Levine (1997) found that for Africa, greater ethnic diversity goes in 
line with low schooling, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange 
markets, and insufficient infrastructure.  
In  general,  these  results  were  confirmed  using  a  survey  data  set  from  the 
Afrobarometer,  a  relatively  new  survey  measuring  the  social,  political  and  economic 
atmosphere in more than ten countries in Africa. Examining these results, we observe that 
individuals in Botswana are more compliant than those in South Africa.  The marginal 
effects indicate that being a resident of Botswana rather than of South Africa increases 
the probability of reporting the highest tax honesty by around 6 percentage points. This 
result  is  robust  across  various  specifications.  Figure  A1  in  the  Appendix  reports  the 
results of the experiment. It shows a clear difference in behavior between subjects from 
Botswana and South Africa throughout most of the different experimental treatments. 
Moreover,  the  results  obtained  also  indicate  that  tax  culture  effect  overwhelms  the 
enforcement  effort.  Thus,  increasing  audit  probability  and/or  the  penalty  for  South 
African subjects leads to lower compliance. 
 
IV. HOW STABLE IS TAX MORALE AND HOW IMPORTANT ARE 
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS? 
 
We have seen in the previous section that values and preferences are affected by policy or 
institutional changes. Thus, these results support Bowles‘ (1998) argument that ―we can 
neither accurately predict nor coherently evaluate the likely consequences of new policies 
or institutions without taking account of preference endogeneity‖ (p. 75). This can be 
seen as an indicator that tax morale does not remain stable over time. Changes in the 
political system have a substantial impact on tax morale. In the fields of behavioral law 
and economics, the importance of social norms in studying compliance with the law has 
been  emphasized  for  several  years  (Ellickson,  1991;  Tyler,  1990b;  Sunstein,  1996; 
Cooter, 1998). Accordingly, social norms are shaped by law and by social interactions. In   30 
addition to the direct deterrence effects of legal sanctions, Posner (1998, 2000a, b) argues 
that deterrence signals social norms to citizens in order to educate them what they should 
do. Smith and Mackie (2000, p. 377) note: ―Norms must be brought to mind before they 
can guide behavior. They can be activated by deliberate reminders or by subtle cues, such 
as observations of other people‘s behavior‖. Kahan (1997) suggests that the decision to 
commit  crimes  is  highly  interdependent,  based  on  the  perceived  behavior  of  others: 
―When they perceive that many of their peers are committing crimes, individuals infer 
that the odds of escaping punishment are high and the stigma of criminality is low. To the 
extent  that  many  persons  simultaneously  draw  these  inferences  and  act  on  them, 
moreover, their perceptions become a self-fulfilling reality.‖ (p. 394). As a consequence, 
individuals‘  beliefs  about  crime  are  altered,  suggesting  that  social  influence  affects 
criminality and the propensity to commit crimes. Furthermore, Kahan (1997) suggests 
that the law is able to shape these perceptions by the way in which it creates information 
about the compliance/deviance of citizens. These findings suggest that there is an effect 
of social learning on tax compliance. The relevance of social interaction and crime is 
explored by Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) who focus on the United States 
in their analysis both across cities and across precincts in New York. The results indicate 
that social interaction models provide a framework for understanding variances of cross-
city crime rates. Individuals are more likely to commit crimes when those around them 
do.  Fortin,  Lacroix  and  Villeval  (2007)  analyze  the  impact  of  social  interaction  on 
individual tax decisions in an experimental setting. 
In this section of the report this aspect is explored further. The focus will be on a 
comparison  of  East  and  West  Germany  directly  after  unification  as  a  quasi-natural 
experiment.  Results  might  provide  valuable  insights  how  tax  morale  changes  when 
societies and nations are integrated in new institutional environments. Such insights may 
provide valuable guidance whether we may observe a tax morale adaption process in the 
Eastern enlargement process of the European Union.  Moreover, this section will also 
explore the importance of social interactions focusing on Eastern and Western Europe. 
Feld, Torgler and Dong (2008) analyse the differences in tax morale between East 
and West Germany and the convergence of morale across time between 1990 and 1999 
German unification provides valuable insights  for the analysis of tax morale because   31 
many factors can be controlled for which are similar in both parts of the country, e.g., a 
common language, similar education systems and a shared cultural and political history 
after the Second World War and prior to the separation. As a consequence, an East-West 
comparison has a methodological advantage as compared to cross-country studies. Thus, 
it is possible to observe how taxpayers adapt to a new legal environment that provides 
signals to them how they should behave and how others behave regarding taxation. As 
the Iron Curtain fell, former GDR citizens became exposed to the West German system 
including the social welfare state, the tax system and the whole set of formal and informal 
rules. The question remains how fast individuals may change their social norms. In the 
focus  countries,  people  gradually  internalized  norms  and  values  they  were  forced  to 
respect for years before the reunification. Feld et al. (2008) were interested in exploring 
these social learning effects on tax morale over time. The unification process provides for 
a unique opportunity to study this research question. East German citizens faced different 
legal systems before and after unification. While deterrence was generally high in the old 
GDR, black markets and the shadow economy were ubiquitous. Thus, each GDR citizen 
could  observe  that  their  fellow  citizens  engaged  in  the  shadow  economy.  After 
unification, East German taxpayers were confronted with new laws and new deterrence 
levels  which  have  only  been  slowly  increased  across  time.  East  Germans  could  also 
realize  the  tax  morale  of  the  West  German  taxpayers  and  adjust  their  behavior 
accordingly. So far, the literature on tax compliance has failed to explore social learning, 
herding  behavior  or  convergence  processes  in  general.  This  paper  addresses  this 
shortcoming by exploring the unification process in Germany using three World Values 
Survey/European Values Survey waves between 1990 and 1999. German unification is 
interesting  for  the  analysis  of  tax  morale  over  time  and  the  exploration  of  a  social 
learning  process.  As  mentioned,  many  factors  can  be  controlled  (e.g.,  a  common 
language, similar education systems and a shared cultural and political history prior to the 
separation after the Second World War). Feld et al.‘s (2008) findings indicate that tax 
morale  converged  after  unification  in  Germany.  While  tax  morale  was  significantly 
different  in  East  compared  to  West  Germany  in  1990,  both  regions  do  not  differ 
significantly in their tax morale levels in 1999. This result holds whether descriptive 
analysis,  non-parametric  tests  or  a  differentiated  multivariate  analysis  is  conducted.   32 
Within just nine years after unification, tax morale values strongly converged, due in 
particular to a significant change in the level of tax morale in the East. Interestingly, older 
individuals in the East who were exposed for a longer time to the old regime, were less 
likely to change their social norms. As Kasper and Streit (1999) argue, the East Germans 
had to unlearn the old institutions and learn new ones, which requires some time and 
practice. 
Looking at social interactions, one can argue that the behavior of other taxpayers 
is  of  great  importance  in  understanding  taxpayers‘  compliance.  Individuals  pay  their 
taxes conditionally, depending on the pro-social behavior of other taxpayers. They are 
more willing to pay their taxes if they perceive others to be honest. The extent to which 
others also contribute, triggers more or less cooperation and systematically influences the 
willingness  to  contribute.  Relying  on  surveys  from  30  European  countries  (EVS 
1999/2000), Frey and Torgler (2007) show that if taxpayers believe tax evasion to be 
common, their tax morale decreases. In contrast, if they believe others to be honest, their 
tax  morale  increases.  This  result  is  consistent  with  the  literature  on  conditional 
cooperation (see, e.g., Rabin, 1998; Falk and Fehr, 2002; Tyran and Feld, 2006). Lewis 
(1982, p. 144) argues for the possible existence of a ―tax subculture, with its own set of 
unwritten rules and regulations. Thus I am more likely to evade not only because I have 
friends  who,  I  know,  have  got  away  with  it  (so  why  shouldn‘t  I?)  but  also  because 
evasion is ethically acceptable among my friends … Furthermore, ‗no friends of mine can 
be criminals‘ …‗What‘s good enough for fine, upstanding citizens like Fred Bloggs, John 
Doe, Donald Campbell, Herman Schmitt and Hans Anderson is good enough for me‘‖.  
 Frey and Torgler (2007) use a non-linear ordered probit model (due to ranking 
information of the scaled dependent variable), and control for a large set of factors.  They 
employ  the  following  question  to  investigate  the  impact  of  conditional  cooperation: 
“According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following: Cheat on taxes if 
they  get  the  chance?”  (4=almost  all,  1=almost  none).  Consistent  with  the  social 
interaction and conditional cooperation literature, the estimation results indicate that the 
higher is the perceived tax evasion of other individuals, the lower is the respondent‘s tax 
morale. The size of the effect is substantial; if perceived tax evasion rises by one unit, the 
percentage of persons reporting high tax morale falls by 7.4 percentage points. Table A4   33 
indicates  the  importance  of  conditional  cooperation  focusing  on  all  single  countries 
individually summarizing the results of 30 regressions reporting only the coefficient for 
conditional cooperation. In 27 of the 30 countries, the coefficients are highly statistically 
significant and have a negative sign. This is strong evidence of conditional cooperation in 
most  Eastern  and  Western  European  countries.  The  more  individuals  expect  others 
members of society to cooperate, the higher the individual‘s intrinsic motivation to pay 
taxes. 
 
V. EVIDENCE FROM A EUROPEAN COUNTRY: 
A CASE STUDY ON SPAIN 
 
To better understand potential developments of tax morale in transition countries, one 
may focus on a European country that has a history of being part of the European Union 
and that has experienced substantial changes over time. It is therefore valuable to focus 
on Spain; the country has undergone fundamental changes in the public sector since its 
transition to a democratic system after the death of General Francisco Franco in 1975. 
The previous two sections of this report would suggest that such changes should affect 
tax morale in Spain. These very significant changes in Spanish society during the last 30 
years offer an opportunity to examine citizens‘ attitudes toward paying taxes and the 
ways  in  which  these  attitudes  are  affected  by  changes  in  government  policies  and 
institutions.  Martinez-Vazquez  and  Torgler  (2009)  use  survey  data  from  the  World 
Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Survey (EVS) to observe the evolution 
of  tax  morale  in  Spain  at  four  benchmark  years:  1981,  1990,  1995,  and  1999/2000. 
Although these years do not coincide with any particular key event in the recent history 
of Spain, they cover a period long enough to incorporate many of the important reforms 
of the Spanish public sector. The study of the evolution of tax morale in modern Spain is 
particularly interesting because of the constitutional and political changes after Franco 
died  in  1975.  The  advent  of  a  fully  democratic  state,  deep  tax  policy  and  tax 
administration  reforms,  a  significant  push  for  decentralization,  joining  the  European 
Community and so on provide excellent benchmarks for institutional changes that are 
expected in the compliance literature to change tax morale. The issue of tax morale in 
Spain  so  far  has  attracted  little  attention  in  the  literature  (for  exceptions,  see  Prieto   34 
Rodriguez, Sanzo-Pérez and Suárez Pandiello, 2005; Molero and Pujol, 2005; Alm and 
Torgler, 2006; Alm and Gomez, 2009) and as a novelty Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler 
(2009) focus on the inter-temporal evolution of tax morale in a country using data from 
different WVS survey waves. 
The last 30 years represent a period of radical transformation for Spain, which could 
have profoundly affected the way citizens view the state and ultimately, their tax morale. 
The state of tax morale was quite low at the end of Franco‘s regime. As reported by 
Comin (2007), at the end of the 1970s, tax evasion in Spain was estimated at 40 percent 
of tax receipts and above 90 percent of all Spanish taxpayers recognized the existence of 
fiscal  fraud.  In  addition,  at  the  time  the  fiscal  system  provided  ample  tax  evasion 
opportunities for the wealthy, and there was no political will to prosecute fiscal fraud. In 
particular,  tax  evasion  was  not  a  criminal  offense  and  evaders  only  received  small 
administrative sanctions. After Franco‘s death, the first democratic elections took place in 
1977  and  were  won  by  a  center-right  coalition  (the  UCD  —  Unión  de  Centro 
Democrático). The highlight of this period was the coalescence of all political forces in 
the country in what became known as the Moncloa Pacts of 1977. These Pacts set the 
foundations for political reform, with a new Constitution being approved in 1978. These 
Pacts  also  set  the  blueprints  for  deep  fiscal  reform,  including  legislation  making  tax 
evasion  a  crime.    The  goals  of  the  Moncloa  Pacts  were  to  introduce  policy  and 
institutional reforms in the public and private sectors, that would bring Spain up to par 
with the system Spain‘s European neighbors had put in place almost three decades earlier 
following the end of World War II (see Comin, 2007). The period subsequent to the 
Moncloa Pacts was one of political indecision, poor economic performance and political 
turmoil - including a failed coup by a small group of security forces in 1981. It appeared 
that the government had withdrawn from its commitments made in the Moncloa Pacts in 
terms of policy reforms, including the modernization of the tax administration and the 
fight against tax evasion. 
Fiscal  and  other  institutional  reforms  gained  momentum  with  the  new  Socialist 
Party:  the  Partido  Socialista  Obrero  Español  (PSOE)  government  after  their  election 
victory in 1982.  The PSOE would stay in power until the general elections of 1996. 
Several important changes and reforms took place during this period. Perhaps the most   35 
significant event was joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986. The 
accession to the EEC meant, among other things, the introduction for the first time in 
Spain of the Valued Added Tax (VAT), required by the harmonization of Spain‘s tax 
system with EEC rules. 
But even before the accession to the EEC the government embarked on a series of 
fiscal reforms. The first Socialist government tax reforms that took place between 1983 
and 1987 developed the vision of the Moncloa Pacts. Besides the introduction of the 
VAT, the Personal Income Tax was overhauled with an emphasis on vertical equity and 
progressivity. Also important for the evolution of tax morale in this period, a major effort 
got  under  way  to  modernize  the  tax  administration  apparatus.  These  reforms  in  tax 
administration  included  the  territorial  reorganization  of  the  tax  agency,  the 
computerization of services, upgraded professional careers for tax officials, and setting 
up  other  instruments  for  increasing  voluntary  taxpayer  compliance  and  fighting  tax 
evasion.  Following the Supreme Court ruling declaring the use of the ―family‖ as the 
unit of taxation unconstitutional, the 1998 tax reform sought to slow down the pace of 
government  growth,  lower  tax  rates  and  broaden  tax  bases  to  increase  economic 
efficiency and horizontal fairness. This was alongside a general aim to bring the Spanish 
tax system in line with the, then existing reform trends, in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. 
As  noted  by  Comin  (2007),  the  1998  reform  package  represented  an  end  to  the 
Spanish welfare state even before the task had been completed. In a way, Spain was still 
trying to catch up with its European peers when the rules of the game had shifted. Thus, 
the fiscal  reforms  of the first  twenty  years of  democracy, were now  also  in  need of 
reform.  Although  many  of  these  necessary  reforms  were  introduced  by  the  Socialist 
government, some were delayed until the change in government. After the right-center 
Partido Popular (PP) took office in 1996, fiscal reform continued to move in the direction 
of increasing the relative importance of indirect over direct taxes and reducing the budget 
deficit and debt levels in order to join the European Monetary Union. Economic realities 
had already forced many of Spain‘s European neighbors to follow suit with tax changes 
in the United States and elsewhere in the world lowering rates, broadening tax bases, 
putting more emphasis on consumption taxes, and containing the costs associated with   36 
social insurance contributions. Potentially more important for tax morale, these reforms 
worldwide  were  now  accepting  the  limitations  of  significant  income  redistribution 
through progressive income taxes. The tax reforms initiated by the PP embraced all these 
principles. For example, tax rates on capital gains were reduced in 1996 and in 1998, and 
a new, more favorable, tax regime for small and medium sized companies was enacted. 
The PP reforms of the Personal Income Tax in the first years of the new millennium were 
further oriented toward reducing the tax burden, especially at the low end of the income 
distribution; more visible were the reductions of marginal tax rates across the board, 
including  the  top  rate.  The  PP  government  at  the  time  also  pursued  strict  budget 
discipline, generating low deficits or surpluses and reducing the outstanding public debt, 
in order to meet the EU‘s requirements in the Stability and Growth Pact.  
Aside  from  these  reforms,  there  were  many  other  events  that  potentially  shaped 
ordinary citizens‘ views of the state. These included the already mentioned coup attempt 
in  1981;  a  sizable  bout  of  corruption  by  public  officials  during  the  last  Socialist 
government  in  the  mid-1990s;  and  a  profound  fiscal,  administrative  and  political 
decentralization enabled by the 1978 Constitution. The state also had to contend with 
centrifugal separatist forces, especially in the Basque Country with the terrorist activity 
by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). On the side of general performance of the economy, 
the country witnessed massive and much needed privatization of state-owned enterprises 
and a rise in unemployment due to a rigid system of labor institutions. Nevertheless the 
Spanish economy continued to experience high rates of economic growth for most of the 
transition period. 
Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler‘s (2009) estimation results support the conjecture that 
during this time, Spain succeeded in designing general institutional reforms, including tax 
policy and tax administration reforms that led to significant increases in tax morale, even 
though some deterioration of tax morale was present between the 1995 and 1999/2000 
observations. A key empirical result in this paper is the significant changes in tax morale 
in Spain over time, as reflected by the time effects estimated across the four time periods 
when the surveys  were  conducted. The time effects  remain statistically  significant  in 
different specifications of the estimating equation. Tax morale increased steadily from 
1981  to  1995  and  then  declined  slightly,  but  nevertheless  significantly  through   37 
1999/2000. The tax and other institutional reforms that got started with the Moncloa 
Pacts and continued through the accession to the European Economic Community quite 
likely helped boost Spanish citizens‘ tax morale. The small but significant decline in tax 
morale during the second half of the 1990s still remains somewhat of a puzzle. However 
likely  causes  identified  include  institutional  changes  such  as  corruption  in  the  public 
sector, a perception of lower levels of tax fairness, or even high levels of unemployment 
in the economy. 
In sum, the dramatic increase in tax effort in a relatively short period of time in Spain 
accompanied  by  improved  taxpayer  morale,  can  provide  useful  lessons  to  transition 
countries in how to execute fiscal reform. Exemplified methods include increasing tax 




VI. EVIDENCE FROM A TRANSITION COUNTRY: 
A CASE STUDY ON RUSSIA 
 
In many Eastern European countries fundamental changes in the role and effectiveness of 
the public sector have occurred during the transition years in the 1990s. It may therefore, 
be interesting to explore a key and important player in Eastern Europe, namely Russia. In 
November 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and the Russian Federation was born 
after Russia and other former Soviet republics refused to remit tax revenues to the Soviet 
government (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, 2001).  Many difficult policy choices had to 
be made in this new era including the role of the public sector in general and the structure 
of the tax system in particular.  Indeed, two of the biggest challenges were to reinvent the 
state, which had endured (during Soviet times mostly) a record of ineffectiveness and 
corruption, and to convince citizens who had not paid taxes directly under the Soviet 
regime, to start complying voluntarily with their new tax obligations. 
  The dynamic changes in Russia during the transition decade of the 1990s offer an 
excellent opportunity to examine citizens‘ attitudes toward paying taxes. In particular, 
they  are  helpful  in  analyzing  the  ways  in  which  these  attitudes  are  affected  by  (or   38 
reflected in) changes in government policies and institutions. Alm, Martinez-Vazquez 
and Torgler (2006) use therefore micro-level  data for Russia from  the World  Values 
Survey and the European Values Survey for the years 1991, 1995, and 1999 to examine 
how these attitudes have changed during the tumultuous events of the 1990s. 
The 1990s were a transforming decade for Russia.  This period begins with the 
dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in December 1991. It spans the 
presidency of Boris Yeltsin, who was elected President by popular vote in June 1991 and 
who served until December 1999, when he resigned and Vladimir Putin became acting 
President. Putin was elected president shortly after with considerable popular support and 
authority to carry out a backlog of reforms. The 1990s were also a period during which 
major legislation was enacted
9. Abstracting these legal changes, many other events also 
shaped the perceptions of ordinary citizens toward the new state. Notable socio-political 
events include: the August 1991 coup attempt; the political struggle and final victory of 
Yeltsin over the communist -dominated parliament; the centrifugal separatist forces in 
ethnic regions from Chechnya to Tatarstan to Bashkiria; the massive privatization of state 
assets and the rise of the Russian oligarchs; the questionable alliance of the oligarchs with 
the Kremlin for Yeltsin‘s reelection; the financial crisis and debt default of August 1998; 
the beginning of the economic recovery and  the consolidation of power in Putin‘s hands 
the next year. The Russian Federation is characterized by strong ethnic, economic, and 
fiscal  disparities  between  the  regions,  including  some  sorts  of  secessionist  forces 
(Polishchuck,  1996).  In general,  the  relationship  between the Krelim  and the regions 
during the 1990s went from laissez faire in the early Yeltsin years, to open conflict and 
full  defiance  in  the  middle  of  decade  when  many  of  the  regions  maintained  secret 
bilateral treaties with Moscow, to recentralization and the imposition of more uniform 
discipline toward the end of the decade, especially after Putin took power. However, the 
relationship  between  Moscow  and  the  89  regions  varied  considerably  across  regions. 
Since  then,  richer,  better-off  regions  have  pushed  for  higher  retention  rates  of  tax 
                                                 
9 This legislation transformed the Russian Federation: the Law on Basic Principles of the Tax System in the 
Russian Federation (December 1991); the new Constitution of 1994; the Law on the General Principles of 
Organization of Local Self-government in the Russian Federation (August 1995); the introduction in 1997 
and 1998 of important reforms based on the draft Tax Code, the Budget Code, the Law on Financial 
Foundations of Local Self-governments, and the Concept of Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 
in the Russian Federation.   39 
revenues collected within their borders, while poorer, transfer-dependent regions have 
been supportive of more centralized finances.  Many of the heavily ethnic regions have 
supported  more  autonomy  from  Moscow,  while  those  regions  with  heavy  Russian 
populations identified more with the Russian state.  The dominant political color of the 
regions has also played a role; those regions with a high level of communist party support 
have  been  traditionally  more  antagonist  toward  Moscow  (Martinez-Vazquez,  2002).  
Because of these differences, Alm et al. (2006) stress that attitudes toward paying taxes 
may differ across these regions during the transition years. Subsequently, their data sets 
for 1995 and 1999 allow us to analyze the different levels of tax morale in 11 different 
territories of the Russian Federation. Their results indicate a decay in tax morale in the 
first four years of the transition from 1991 to 1995, and a small recovery in 1999 (see 
Figure A2 in the Appendix). Interestingly, Hanousek and Palda (2008) observe a similar 
pattern exploring tax evasion using survey data from 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 from 
the Czech Republic to measure its development for the years 1995 to 2006. Their results 
indicate that the number and percentage of evaders increased until the early millennium 
and started to decrease calling such an inverse-U shape ―an evasional Kuznets curve‖ (p. 
3) stressing also that this might be an indication that hysteresis ―may not be a feature of 
evasion in a transition economy‖ (p. 3). 
These results from Russia are consistent with the relevance of social norms in tax 
compliance.    The  widespread  perception  of  tax  evasion  along  with  the  economic 
convulsions revealed inadequate social institutions, and led to an initial crowding out of 
the intrinsic motivation  to  pay taxes  from  1991 to  1995.  These results  also  suggest 
restoration of higher trust levels in the state in 1999, after progress in the transition to a 
market  economy  had  been  made  -  a  transition  that  positively  influenced  individual 
attitudes toward paying taxes.  The analysis of disaggregated data for Russian regions 
also shows significant regional differences in tax morale, reflecting self-interest and the 
degree of trust different regions have toward Moscow‘s institutions and policies. Looking 
at the distribution of tax morale scores in each of the three different years, the results 
indicate large differences between the percentage of individuals with a high tax morale (a 
score of 3) and those with the lowest scores across these years (see Figure A3). The 
deterioration  in  tax  morale  in  Russia  from  1991  to  1995  was  strongly  affected  by  a   40 
reduction in the share of those citizens who believe that tax evasion is never justifiable 
(the score of 3), and an increase in the share of individuals who believe that tax evasion is 
justifiable (the score of 0). The tax morale improvement between the 1995 and 1999 is 
based mainly on the reduction of the share represented by those who believe that tax 
evasion is justifiable (the score of 0) and also on steady but small increases in the share of 
individuals in the other three categories. The results indicate that there is a significant 
difference between 1991 and 1995 and also between 1991 and 1999, with higher z-values 
for the year 1991. However, the differences between 1995 and 1999 are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels (see Table A5). These results indicate that, once tax 
morale was crowded out in the early years of the transition, it recovered only slowly 
toward the end of the period. The data for 1999 may be too close to the financial crisis of 
1998 and other recent negative experiences for a marked improvement in tax morale to 
take hold. Nevertheless, these broad swings in tax morale in the aggregate data parallel 
quite well what was happening to and around Russian citizens at those different periods 
during the transition.  Although government was still providing many basic services just 
before the beginning of the transition process in 1991, the overall performance of the 
public  sector  was  poor  and  corruption  levels  were  high.    From  the  very  start  of  the 
transition at the end of 1991 and through the early months of 1992, the socio-economic 
conditions confronting Russian citizens suddenly deteriorated, on a massive scale, as the 
level  and  quality  of  public  services  declined  even  further.    The  rapid  collapse  of 
institutional structures produced a vacuum in the country, followed by worsening income 
inequality and poverty rates.  Quite likely, taxpayers reacted adversely to the economic 
and tax policy changes that were necessary for the transition from a centrally controlled 
to a market economy. 
Overall,  then,  in  the  first  years  of  the  transition,  Russia  did  not  succeed  in 
designing  tax  systems,  tax  administrations,  or  other  government  structures  and 
institutions  (especially  improved  public  service  delivery)  that  would  have  helped  to 
maintain tax morale.  Further, as Kasper and Streit (1999) stress, law and order were 
strongly violated in the former Soviet Union and later in Russia.  The lack of a ―rule of 
law‖  tradition  did  not  help  with  the  institutional  transformation  process  or  the 
improvement of tax morale, at least in the first phases of the transition. Corruption also   41 
increased in the early years, reducing citizens‘ trust in government authority (Levin and 
Satarov, 2000) whilst corruption was likely heightened by a privatization process that 
lacked effective legal regulation and impartial oversight.
10 It has also been criticized that 
in resource-based states such as Russia the state elite has the incentive and ability to 
generated revenues and increase the control over resources relying therefore less on taxes 
which leads to an under-development of tax performance and a reduced level of political 
accountability (Hayoz and Hug, 2007). The evolution of tax reform also likely played a 
role  on  the  behavior  of  tax  morale.    Despite  the  declared  federal  objectives  for 
decentralization  of  the  public  finances,  the  system  rema ined  highly  centralized  as 
regional shares and local revenues or expenditures were dictated by a higher level of 
government (Lavrov, Litwack, and Sutherland, 2000).  As Levin and Satorov (2000) 
point out, the suspicious processes imbedded in the centralize d structure of the tax 
system, where the taxes collected regionally were directed first to the central government, 
before returning to the regions in the form of transfers, contributed little to local citizens‘ 
beliefs  that  their  preferences  counted  at  all.
11  Even so, there was a trend toward an 
improvement in tax morale from 1995 to 1999.  There are several factors that may 
explain this improvement.  The increase may have been influenced by the start of reform 
discussions related to the draft Tax Code and t he Budget Code and also by some new 
initiatives such as the Law on Financial Foundations of Local Self -government and the 
Concept of Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Russian Federation, both 
of which had the goal of increasing revenue autonomy at the subnational level. 
In addition, changes in tax morale over time are also likely to be related to the 
performance of the economy.  If taxpayers can relate poor economic performance to poor 
government policy decisions, then this will affect neg atively voluntary compliance with 
the  taxes.  Conversely,  taxpayers  may  credit  improved  economic  performance  to 
improved government performance, and thereby increase their willingness to pay taxes.  
In this respect, several authors have contrasted the relat ive economic performances of 
                                                 
10 Levin and Satarov (2000) calculate that the level of corruption in the early years of the Russian transition 
exceeded  the  total  expenditures  on  science,  education,  health  care,  culture,  and  art  and  that,  in  some 
industrial branches, criminal groups spent up to 50 percent of their revenues to bribe officials.  They also 
report that in 1995 there were 270 cases of illegal tax inspector activities that were exposed. 
11 Several authors (Bahl and Wallich, 1995; Martinez -Vazquez and Boex, 2001) criticized the lac k of 
transparency in the fiscal system and the failure to provide sub -national governments with adequate 
resources to meet their responsibilities.   42 
Russia and China during the 1990s.  Stiglitz (1999) emphasizes  that, over the decade 
beginning in 1989, China‘s gross domestic product (GDP) doubled while Russia‘s GDP 
almost halved.  Different explanations have been offered for these two performances.  
For example, Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) explain China‘s better performance on the 
basis of the existence of strong central control of the economy by the Communist Party, 
which kept centrifugal forces under check; in contrast, they claim that a weak federal 
government  in  Russia  was  unable  to  control  destructive  behaviors  of  the  regions.  
Similarly, Fisher and Sahay (2000) argue that Russia lagged in the implementation of 
structural reforms and failed to solve its fiscal problems, which led to large fiscal deficits 
and ultimately to the financial collapse in August of 1998.  Shleifer and Treisman (1999) 
blame Russia‘s poorer performance on the common pool incentive problem created in 
Russia by the revenue sharing of all main taxes between the federal government and the 
regions.    In contrast,  Montinola, Qian, and Weingast (1995) and  Qian  and Weingast 
(1996)  argue  that  China‘s  revenue  assignments  were  ―market  preserving‖  (unlike 
Russia‘s)  in  that  the  Chinese  assignments  stimulated  local  governments  to  become 
entrepreneurial  and  to  seek  the  growth  of  their  local  economies.  Whatever  the 
explanation  for  the  poorer  economic  performance  of  Russia,  the  fact  is  that  large 
proportions of the Russian population suffered income declines throughout much of the 
1990s.  For example, Graham and Pettinato (2002) use data from the Russia Longitudinal 
Monitoring  Survey,  and  find  that  77  percent  of  the  population  sampled  had  income 
declines from 1995 to 1998.  Interestingly, at the time of the third Longitudinal Survey in 
1999  the  Russian  economy  experienced  positive  rates  of  growth.  Alm,  Martinez-
Vazquez,  and  Torgler  (2006)  observe  significant  regional  differences  in  individuals‘ 
attitudes toward paying taxes.  There are strong ethnic, economic, and fiscal disparities 
across  the  Russian  regions.    Each  region  generally  shows  a  diverse  picture,  with 
significant  changes  between  1995  and  1999  in  tax  morale.    The  newest  data  they 
analyzed suggest a tendency for wealthier regions to have a higher tax morale than poorer 
ones.  Furthermore, the data suggests a tendency toward lower tax morale prevails  in 
regions possessing strong separatist sentiments, a prevalent belief that the region has been 
exploited by the central government, and a general political dislike for Moscow. The   43 
results also indicate that vertical trust (trust in the government and the legal system) is a 
key driving force to understand what shapes tax morale in Russia. 
There are several possible reasons for this evolution in attitudes. The transition 
imposed a higher and more visible tax burden at a time that a crumbling economy meant 
that many public services had to decline in quality and coverage.  Meanwhile, a nescient 
tax administration adopted highly repressive and antagonistic policies toward taxpayers, 
even those who wanted to comply with the tax laws. During the 1990s, the Russian tax 
enforcement strategy was  strongly based on  coercion  methods, mainly increasing  the 
mandate of law enforcement agents.  The tax police gained increased power, and grew 
into a bureaucracy with around 50,000 employees, or one third of the size of the tax 
administration.    As  a  consequence,  the  number  of  criminal  investigations  by  the  tax 
police increased from 2,500 in 1994 to 16,000 in 1999, a number that represents four 
times more investigations than in the United States in 1999 (Easter, 2007).  It took time 
for the federal tax authorities to realize that a strategy that emphasizes enforcement and 
punishment alone cannot be the only solution to improving voluntary tax compliance.  
Indeed, it is likely that such a strategy had a counter-productive effect.  If the majority of 
taxpayers are not treated as responsible persons with an intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, 
they  may  soon  feel  that  they  may  as  well  be  opportunistic.    Even  so,  such  strict 
enforcement policies are not expected to crowd out the tax morale of honest taxpayers, 
provided  honest  taxpayers  perceive  the  stricter  policy  to  be  directed  mainly  against 
dishonest taxpayers (Frey, 1997).   
 
 
VII. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CENTRAL EASTERN AND 
FORMER SOVIET UNION COUNTRIES 
 
One of the most interesting features in this research is the transition process of former 
Communist countries. Around one quarter of the world population lived in such countries 
(see Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 1997). Frey (2003a) stresses that it is important to 
have social capital in terms of mutual trust and honesty in the transition deregulation and 
privatization  process.  Citizens  in  planned  socialist  economies,  like  that  of  the  Soviet   44 
Union, were not aware of directly paying taxes (Kornai, 1990).  Indeed, during the Soviet 
era, ―taxpayers‖ were ―large in size and small in number‖, and the state had many other 
levers of control besides taxes (Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace, 1999).  However, in a 
shift from a centrally controlled to a market economy, the fiscal system needed to be 
reformed.    These  changes  represented  significant  shocks  to  ordinary  citizens.  In 
particular, individuals were faced for the first time with the direct payment of taxes, 
including being asked to file different tax returns.  The transition process brought up 
many policy questions, among others: the tax system, the structure of tax administration, 
and the degree of political participation.  There are numerous research papers regarding 
the transition process.  However, less evidence is available in regards to tax compliance. 
Voluntary compliance and self-filing, two important pillars in a modern tax system, were 
completely absent just after the planned socialism (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2000).  
Following the early transition, tax evasion and avoidance reached very high levels, as the 
new tax administration was not prepared to enforce taxes in a market-based economy 
with large numbers of taxpayers.  Further, the connection between the payment of taxes 
and the provision of public goods had been largely concealed under socialism, which 
might have reduced the identification with the state and thus the willingness to pay taxes.  
Easter (2007) reports the findings of a poll conducted by the tax administration in the 
Tambov region in the early years of the transition, which indicated that only one-third of 
the  respondents  argued  that  paying  taxes  to  the  state  would  provide  any  benefit  to 
themselves. Fiscal concerns might be a key element and it is also often argued that tax 
evasion is widespread in transition countries (see, e.g., Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2003; 
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2000). Alm and Martinez-Vazquez (2003) point out that 
―In  developing  and  transition  countries  (DTCs)  in  particular,  tax  evasion  is  often 
widespread and, indeed, systematic. Thus, the problem of tax evasion tends to have far 
more serious consequences  in  DTCs  than in  developed economies‖  (p. 147).   In the 
transition process, revenue needs are an important issue. Gordon (1994) points out that in 
the  reform  process,  governments  in  Eastern  Europe  are  confronted  with  expenditure 
needs such as investment demand, infrastructure improvements, and social insurances. In 
such situations, the degree of the individuals‘ tax morale might be a key determinant.  
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (1997) argued that it is not surprising to see taxpayers‘   45 
resistance movements in the reform process when they are taxed for the first time. The 
undeveloped tax administrations, mostly engaged in cash management, were not prepared 
to do their work in a modern income tax system. A main problem was the lack of skills 
and experience of the tax administration with market-oriented taxes, alongside the failure 
of salaries to attract quality personnel to the tax administration profession. Moreover, 
weaknesses  in  the  application  of  tax  practices  have  induced  substantial  problems. 
Unstable tax policies had damaging effects to the economic and social system. Sloppy tax 
legislation and the arbitrariness of rulings on behalf of the tax administration (Owsiak, 
2007)  have  reduced  state‘s  credibility.  New  procedures  have  only  been  implemented 
slowly  (for  an  overview  see  Martinez-Vazquez  and  McNab,  1997).  Casanegra  de 
Jantscher,  Silvani  and  Vehorn  (1992)  point  out  that  tax  collection  problems  arise  in 
transition countries as, e.g., taxpayers are required to ―physically make a trip to either a 
tax office, a post office, or a bank‖ (p. 125). This presupposes that these services are 
reliable. Furthermore, much greater problems result from the fact that with an increasing 
amount of taxpayers it becomes much more difficult to detect tax evaders or avoiders. In 
this context it might be interesting to see to which extent tax morale has changed over 
time and what shapes tax morale in Central and Eastern European countries (CEE). 
Frey and Torgler (2007) explore differences in tax morale between Western and 
Eastern  Europe  because  the  reform  process  in  the  transition  countries  caused 
disorientation and a heavy economic burden according to Kasper and Streit (1999) and 
Gërxhani (2004). The rapid collapse of institutional structures produced a vacuum in 
many countries that led to large social costs, especially in terms of worsening income 
inequality and poverty rates and bad institutional conditions based on uncertainty and 
high transaction costs. The countries in CEE have more secure property rights, because 
the transition process occurred earlier and more rapidly. Gërxhani (2004) points out that 
many transition countries have an institutional crisis after the collapse of communism. 
She argues that an institutional crisis produces a gap between old institutional destruction 
and  the  establishment  of  new  institutions.  A  reform  process  imposes  high  costs  of 
disorientation and economic burden (Kasper and Streit, 1999). It is thus useful to observe 
the development of tax morale as a dependent variable over time, controlling for many 
factors. It is interesting to analyze the development over time in various Central and   46 
Eastern European countries as countries started the course of transition from different 
historical  backgrounds,  physical  endowments  and  reform  processes.  One  of  the  most 
difficult processes is the transformation of social contracts. Stiglitz (1999) points out: ―If 
―reformers‖ simply destroy the old norms and constraints in order to ―clean the slate‖ 
without allowing for the time-consuming processes of reconstructing new norms, then the 
new  legislated  institutions  may  well  not  take  hold‖  (p.  9).  Table  A6  reports  higher 
institutional quality in CEE countries, than in FSU countries using six proxies of the 
governance  indicators  developed  by  Kaufmann,  Kraay,  and  Mastruzzi  (2004).  Thus 
individual uncertainty was reduced leading to a better transition process with more stable 
institutions. As in many developing countries we might observe that transition countries 
are in a situation of ―over-government‖ and ―under-government‖ (Frey and Eichenberger, 
1999, p. 89). There is a strong combination of interventionism and bureaucracy. On the 
other hand, property rights are not sufficiently secured and there is a high degree of 
uncertainty,  reducing  thus  the  incentive  for  investment.  For  transition  countries  it  is 
difficult to find the right equilibrium of state activity, as the collapse of communism was 
a collapse of a vast state apparatus. A frequent use of the exit option in form of tax 
evasion or tax avoidance by entering the shadow economy has the negative effect of 
reducing  the  state‘s  tax  collection,  affecting  thus  the  revenues  governments  need  to 
provide public goods and to build trustworthy institutions. Many countries might react 
with the problematic strategy of increasing taxes. This enlarges the shadow economy, as 
the incentive for enterprises to evade taxes increases; they just pay, e.g., more bribes to 
protect themselves (see Levin and Satarov, 2000). Campos and Coricelli (2002) stress 
that reforms progressed much faster in CEE countries than in FSU countries. Moreover, 
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2000) argue that, in countries negotiating their accession 
to the European Union, the accession intention acted as a catalyst for rapid tax reform 
shaped along western lines. As a consequence, one would predict significantly lower tax 
morale  in  Former  Soviet  Union  (FSU)  economies  than  in  CEE  economies.  Rose-
Ackerman (2001) reports that citizens are critical regarding the transition process and 
state institutions and officials and that the ―sense of stasis is highest for the former parts 
of the Soviet Union‖ (p. 419).    47 
Table 2 presents mean tax morale values for transition countries in the first 9 
years transition periods based on a scale from 0 to 3, were 3 is the highest tax morale (tax 
morale is never justifiable) while value 0 integrates values 4 to 10 (see Torgler, 2003). 
CEE countries show a higher tax morale than FSU countries. Furthermore, we can see a 
decay of tax morale over time between the years 1990 and 1997. These results are in line 
with the registered decline of the living standard in the transition countries. This effect is 
much stronger for FSU than for CEE countries. One can also see a high decay of tax 
morale in the Baltic countries Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. However, between the years 
1995-1997 and 1999-2000, a stabilization of tax morale in the FSU countries and an 
increase of tax morale in CEE countries is observed. However, the main disadvantage in 
this case is the fact that only a small number of countries participated in all three survey 
waves.  
Poland shows a consistent increase of tax morale over time. Kasper and Streit 
(1999) point out that Poland‘s strategy after the fall of the Berlin Wall, was a continuous 
and  systematic  institutional  transformation  without  the  unnecessarily  rapid  approach 
favored amongst other nations. We find a strong economic growth in the years 1994 to 
1997. Between 1989 and 1997 Poland had an average annual rate of GDP growth of 1.6, 
which was the highest among the transition countries.  Thus, it is not surprising that 
Poland in our analysis improved tax morale over time. Kornai (2000) stresses that the 
main explanations for the success of development in Poland were the successful macro 
stabilization, the bottom-up growth of the private sector, and the inflow of foreign capital. 
Furthermore, Poland was the first transition country after Hungary to reform its income 
tax  (Martinez-Vazquez  and  McNab,  2000).  Several  Central  and  Eastern  European 
countries have tried in the last decade to simplify their tax systems which may have 
contributed to an increase in tax compliance reducing the tax compliance costs (Hayoz 
and Hug, 2007). Changes in the tax system in line with developed countries on the road 
to integration with the EU (Owsiak, 2007). Interestingly, Bulgaria also shows a strong 
increase  of  tax  morale.  Bulgaria  fell  into  a  depression  with  a  strong  decline  in  the 
beginning  of  the  90s.  Between  1989  and  1997,  the  real  GDP  fell  by  37.2%  and 
unemployment  increased  from  2%  (1991)  to  14%  (1997).  Furthermore,  real  living 
standards decreased with subsequent reductions in consumption (Bristow, 2000). Bogetić   48 
(1995) points out that the initial transformation conditions in Bulgaria were more similar 
to FSU countries than to CEE countries. Bulgaria had a strong decline in revenues in the 
first years after the collapse of traditional tax bases, similar to the countries Albania, 
Moldova, Lithuania, Armenia, Georgia. However, at the end of 1994 considerable efforts 
have been made to liberalize the economy enabling output to commence growing anew. 
But Bogetić and Hassan (1997) criticize the income tax development in Bulgaria. The 
1993 amendments have complicated the tax system and increased the marginal tax rates 
from  40  to  52  %.  On  the  other  hand,  Martinez-Vazquez  (1995)  states  that  in  1994 
Bulgaria has already established good revenue assignment systems as, e.g., local own-
source  revenues.  Looking  at  the  1999-2000  data  for  CEE  countries  we  observe  low 
values from Romania. Uslaner (2007, p. 36) stresses that it ―may not make much sense to 
have much faith in the legal system where the courts and the police cannot – or will not – 
control corruption or where citizens cannot see that their contribution to the public weal 
actually makes the public more wealthy. In this sense, Romania is not exceptional: There 
may be less reason for Romanians to have faith in their leaders, who have been unable to 
control corruption or to bring its citizens prosperity.‖ 
Frey  and  Torgler  (2007)  use  a  multivariate  approach  to  explore  country 
differences working with the EVS 1999-2000. The estimated coefficient for the Western 
Europe  dummy,  suggests  that  the  institutional  crisis  in  many  transition  countries  in 
Eastern Europe  after the collapse of communism, tended to  affect  negatively the tax 
morale  of  citizens.  The  marginal  effects  indicate  that  being  a  citizen  of  a  Western 
European country, rather than an Eastern European country, increases the probability of 
responding that tax evasion is never justified by more than 3 percentage points. Frey and 
Torgler (2007) also explored single country differences with Table A7 in the Appendix 
presenting the results. Country dummies are included in the estimation equation, using 
GERMANY as a reference. It is interesting to note that the Central Eastern European 
(CEE)  countries,  Hungary,  Czech  Republic,  Slovak  Republic,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  and 
Poland exhibit higher tax morale than Germany. The coefficient of the first four countries 
is  statistically  significant.  Table  A7  also  reveals  that  Former  Soviet  Union  (FSU) 
countries, such as Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia or Latvia have lower tax 
morale than Central Eastern European (CEE) countries. It seems that CEE countries have   49 
been more successful than FSU countries at designing tax systems, tax administrations, 
and  government  structures  in  which  taxpayers  can  put  their  trust.  Hence,  our  results 
suggest that CEE countries have been more successful than FSU countries at designing 
tax systems, tax administrations, and government structures in which taxpayers can place 
their trust. Such institutional improvements and observable changes may help to explain 
the  higher  willingness  to  cooperate  in  CEE  countries,  some  of  which  exhibit  higher 
values of tax morale than some Western European countries. 
  Torgler (2007) explores the differences between CEE and FSU in different stages, 
namely in 1989-1993, 1995-1998 and 1999-2001 across 22 transition countries. Using a 
multivariate analysis, the study finds that that in most of the three time periods there is a 
statistically  significant  difference  between  CEE  and  FSU  countries;  interestingly,  the 
difference between CEE and FSU is  statistically  significant  in  all specifications.  The 
marginal effects are much higher in the years 1995-1998, indicating a higher divergence 
between the regions. The study also indicates that the respondents originating from a 
CEE rather than from a FSU country, increases the probability of stating that ―tax evasion 
is never justified‖ by around 13 percentage points (compared to around 2 percentage 
points  in  1989-1993).  Looking  at  the  1999-2001  data,  FSU  countries  have  still 
significantly lower tax morale than the CEE countries. However, the marginal effects 
have not increased as in the previous years and some are even observed to be lower (close 
to 9 percentage points). 
  What are the driving forces that shape tax morale in Central Eastern and Former 
Soviet Union countries? Trust in the government and the legal system seemed to be key 
factors. Governments fulfill a leading role in the transition process; institutional changes 
are connected to uncertainty. Institutions provide a reduction of uncertainty by designing 
the provided structure of interaction. As a consequence, greater certainty in the political 
process is gained. Ensley and Munger (2001) argue that ―if rules are not formalized, the 
players may spend too much time arguing over the rules and less time competing in 
productive  activities‖  (p.  116).  And  Kasper  and  Streit  (1999)  stress  that  ―Strong 
institutional  controls  and  accountability  are  required  to  control  deeply  rooted  agent 
opportunism. The rule of law has to be imposed on all government agents‖ (p. 432). 
Thus, stable and easily knowable institutions help create reliability. A government based   50 
on  a  well-functioning  democracy  produces  more  trust  than  a  dictatorship.  A  lack  of 
public trust undermines state revenues and thus the government‘s ability to perform its 
function. Trust in public officials might tend to increase taxpayers‘ positive attitudes and 
commitment to the tax system and tax-payment, which finally exerts a positive influence 
upon  tax  compliance.  As  seen  before  in  the  previous  sections,  institutions  taxpayers 
perceive as fair and efficient might have a positive effect on tax morale, conditionally 
depending  on  whether  society  views  taxes  as  a  price  paid  for  government‘s  positive 
actions. Thus, if taxpayers trust their public officials, they are more willing to be honest. 
If the government acts trustworthily, taxpayers might be more willing to comply with the 
taxes.  Similar  to  the  tax  administration,  the  relationship  between  taxpayers  and 
government can be seen as a relational contract or psychological contract, which involves 
strong emotional ties and loyalties. Such a psychological tax contract can be maintained 
by positive actions, based on trust. If the government tries to generate trust with well 
functioning institutions, co-operation can be initiated or increased. Furthermore, when 
taxpayers are satisfied with the way they are treated, the co-operation is enhanced. If the 
outcome received from the government is judged to be fair in relation to the taxes paid, 
no distress arises. Raiser, Haerpfer, Nowotny and Wallace (2001) found that in transition 
countries, social capital in the form of civic participation and trust in public institutions 
has a significant impact on growth. Weakness of the legal system is a major problem in a 
process of transition. Levin and Satorov (2000) stress that after the collapse of socialism, 
―judicial  weakness  left  a  legal  vacuum  that  remains  unfilled‖  (p.  120).  Thus,  as  the 
transition  process  gives  the  opportunity  to  build  new  trustworthy  institutions,  much 
weight  should  be  put  on  developing  a  trustworthy  ground  so  that  taxpayers  feel 
comfortable  with  paying  taxes.  Our  results  indicate  that  tax  administration  and 
government are forced to drastically change their structures and their relationship with 
taxpayers. As Casanegra de Jantscher et al. (1992) pointed out several years ago: ―A 
major challenge for countries in transition will be to develop tax systems that facilitate, 
rather than complicate compliance‖ (p. 140). 
Another driving force is corruption. In many former centrally planned economies, 
the government and the administration still maintain a strong discretionary power over 
the allocation of resources, implicitly enhancing corruption. Levin and Satarov (2000),   51 
e.g., analyze corruption and institutions in Russia. They criticize that corruption is an 
integral part of Russia‘s economy. Levin and Satarov state that the degree of corruption 
exceeds the total expenditures on science, education, health care, culture, and art. In some 
industrial branches criminal groups spend up to 50% of their revenues to bribe officials 
(p. 115). Tanzi (2002, p. 28) mentions several situations, in which corruption is likely to 
be a problem in the tax administration:  
 
―-the laws are difficult to understand and can be interpreted differently so that taxpayers 
need assistance in complying with them; 
-the  payment  of  taxes  requires  frequent  contacts  between  taxpayers  and  tax 
administrators; 
-the wages of the tax administrators are low; 
-acts of corruption on the part of the tax administrators are ignored, not easily discovered, 
or when discovered penalized only mildly; 
-the administrative procedures (e.g., the criteria for the selection of taxpayers for audits) 
lack  transparency  and  are  not  closely  monitored  within  the  tax  or  customs 
administrations; 
-tax administrators have discretion over important decisions, such as those related to the 
provision of tax incentives, determination of tax liabilities, selection of audits, litigations, 
and so on‖ 
 
In countries where corruption is systemic and the government budget lacks transparency 
it cannot be assumed that the obligation of paying taxes is an accepted social norm. 
Corruption generally undermines the tax morale of the citizens who become frustrated. 
Taxpayers will feel cheated if they believe that corruption is widespread and their tax 
burden is not spent well. Corrupt bureaucracy will not award the services to the most 
efficient producers, but to the producers which offers the largest bribes. Thus, corruption 
reduces  the  efficiency  of  allocation  and  produces  delays  in  transactions  to  acquire 
additional payments (see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Jain, 2001). 
Figure 3 visualizes this point, checking the correlation between tax morale and 
the  corruption  ratings  commonly  used  in  the  literature.  We  use  an  average  value 
developed  by  Abed  and  Davoodi  (2002,  p.502),  based  on  the  rankings  of  the   52 
Transparency International, the Political Risk Service, the International Risk Guide, and 
the Business International. Focusing only on the corruption ratings one should note a 
higher values go in line with lower corruption. We observe a highly positive correlation 
between  the  corruption  ratings  and  the  tax  morale,  including  19  countries  (r=0.610, 
significant at the 0.01 level). In other words, a higher level of tax morale is correlated 
with lower corruption. This result is consistent with Uslaner (2007) in showing that high 
levels of perceived corruption are associated with high levels of tax evasion. 
Torgler (2007b) using a multivariate analysis indicates that there is a significant 
negative  correlation  between  tax  morale  and  the  perceived  size  of  corruption.  The 
advantage of this study is that perceived corruption was collected at the individual level. 
The use of ‗perceived corruption‘ is in line with other indexes employing measures of 
perceptions (such as the Transparency International index). However, perceptions are not 
objective, nor are they quantitative measures of the actual degree of corruption. Rather, 
perceptions are an indirect mechanism for measuring corruption (Tanzi, 2002). However 
Treisman (2000, pp. 410-411), in his analysis of the Transparency International index, 
was able to present valid arguments as to why data based on perceptions should be taken 
seriously.  Components  of  the  surveys  and  ratings  are  highly  correlated  among 
themselves,  even  though  they  have  been  conducted  with  different  methodologies, 
different inputs and in different time periods. Such consistency allows us to conclude that 
factors  are  almost  free  of  biases  such  as  a  ―temporal  mood‖  or  guesses.  A  practical 
method by  which  one  can test  whether the World  Values Survey question about  the 
perceived corruption is through the use of a useful proxy to check whether the variable is 
correlated  with  other  well-known  indexes  on  corruption.  Thus,  comparing  the  WVS 
variable  with  the  corruption  indexes  TI  (Transparency  International),  International 
Country  Risk  Guide  (ICRG)  and  Quality  of  Government  (Control  of  Corruption) 
developed  by  Kaufmann,  Kraay,  and  Mastruzzi  (2004).  The  WVS  corruption  ratings 
(higher values=lower corruption) are highly correlated with the TI (r= -0.878), the ICRG 
(r=-0.680) and the Quality of Government rating (r=-0.827)
12. Torgler‘s (2007b) results 
indicate that an increase in the perceived level of corruption by one unit increases the 
                                                 
12 The sign is negative because for all three ratings used (TI, ICRG and Quality of Government), a  higher 
score corresponds to a lower corruption.    53 
share of subjects indicating the highest tax morale by more than 1.7 percentage points. 
Thus, a higher degree of perceived corruption crowds out tax morale. If taxpayers notice 
that many public officials are corrupt and many other taxpayers evade taxes, they might 
get  the  feeling  that  their  intrinsic  motivation  is  not  recognized  or  honored.  Thus, 
taxpayers get the feeling that they too can be opportunistic. The moral costs to evade 
taxes decrease. 
Interestingly, Torgler (2003) also observe that the self-employed have a lower tax 
morale than full-time employees. This result is not surprising, especially in transition 
countries  where self-employed individuals  are confronted with  and restricted by high 
transaction costs imposed by unduly inefficient government activities
13. States‘ position 
and its reputation was affected due to numerous mistakes in the tax practices since the 
beginning of the transformation process: ―The state‘s attitude in many instances can be 
described as blatantly irresponsible. This usually took the form of continuously modified 
tax policy concepts (partially implemented). When observing the politicians‘ behavior in 
the area of taxes, one could get the impression that they juggled with tax instruments 
without fully realizing that these ―toys‖ could go off one day. This attitude is typical of 
almost all governments of post-communist countries where the applied fiscal tools fail to 
ensure financial stability but their reform is opposed by the society‖ (Owsiak, 2007, p. 
202).  This  induced  a  higher  level  of  tax  awareness,  reputation  costs,  and  a  higher 
sensibility towards unfair treatments: ―All attempts to improve the tax system on the part 





It seems to be important to consider the moral dimension of complying with societies‘ 
rules, underlying legal structure and countries‘ security of property rights. A failure of a 
country‘s  legal  system  undermines  tax  morale  and  tax  compliance.  Also,  regulatory 
restraints  and  bureaucratic  procedures  limit  the  operation  of  markets,  enhancing  the 
                                                 
13 Djankov et al. (2002) show with data from 75 countries that in general heavier regulation of entry goes in 
line  with a  higher corruption and a  higher  shadow economy. On the other  hand, countries  with  more 
democratic and limited governments have less entry regulations.   54 
incentives  to  act  in  the  shadow  economy  or  to  evade  taxes.  A  more  legitimate  and 
responsive  state  appears  to  be  an  essential  precondition  in  generating  compliance.  If 
individual and business contracts are not enforced and productive efforts not protected, 
the  incentive  to  be  active  illegally  increases.  Citizens  feel  cheated  if  corruption  is 
widespread, their tax burden is not spent well, and that they are not protected by the rules 
of law. Such a situation also increases the incentive not be compliant. Discussing tax 
reforms in transition Owsiak (2007, p. 223) stresses that ―reforms under way in post-
communist  countries  should  not,  at  the  present  stage  of  in-depth  restructuring  of  the 
economy,  rely  exclusively  on  tax  cuts  but  instead  should  concentrate  on  measures 
enhancing citizen trust in law and on the removal of sources of tax-related abuse. The 
establishment of a legal framework that would render the tax system stable, transparent, 
simple, friendly to taxpayers, accompanied by concurrent implementation of a rational 
mechanism  for  allocating  and  controlling  public  spending,  highlighting  the  relation 
between collected taxes and the benefits gained by local communities, would ultimately 
determine whether society will welcome the development of tax-related civil behavioral 
patterns‖ (p. 223). Evidence in the tax morale literature indicates that positive attitudes 
towards the tax authority and tax system significantly increase tax morale. A respectful 
and fair treatment of taxpayers induces respect for the tax system and thus leads to co-
operation.  On  the  other  hand,  a  higher  perceived  tax  burden  and  inefficiencies  and 
unfairness in the interaction between the tax administration and the taxpayers crowds out 
the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. International evidence also shows that instead of 
focusing so much on compliance management, risk control, or structuring the application 
of enforcement discretion, it may make sense if the tax administration becomes more 
focused on service, customers, quality, transparency and process improvement. 
Social norms or social capital are key factors in understanding the motivation for 
compliance in transition countries and other regions. Moreover, social capital seems to be 
an important determinant of economic phenomena like macroeconomic performance. For 
example,  Knack  and  Keefer  (1997)  find,  in  a  cross-sectional  analysis,  a  strong  and 
significantly  positive  relationship  between  social  capital  variables  (civic  duty)  and 
economic growth. Schaltegger and Torgler (2007), using data for a synthetic panel of 
Swiss  cantons  over  the  1981–2001  period,  show  that  accountability  enhances  fiscal   55 
performance. As Slemrod (1998) argues, social capital – measured as the willingness to 
pay  taxes  voluntarily  –  lowers  the  cost  of  government  operations  and  of  equitably 
assigning such cost to citizens. Such research justifies a closer look at social capital and 
societal institutions. A high level of governance and institutional quality allows one to 
express one‘s own preferences, involvement and participation in the political process. It 
also enhances identification with the state‘s institutions, counteracting inclinations to be 
non-compliant. Participation and identification therefore reduce free-rider problems. If 
citizens and authorities interact with a sense of collective responsibility under inspiring 
institutional  structures,  the  system  may  be  better  governed  and  the  policies  more 
effective,  as  accountability  promotes  effectiveness  through  its  impact  on  government 
behavior (Schaltegger and Torgler, 2007). The institutional architecture and governance 
quality seem to be a key component in the understanding of tax morale, the shadow 
economy and tax performance.  
Changes in the political system have a substantial impact on tax morale. This can 
be seen as an indicator that tax morale does not remain stable over time. Moreover, social 
norms  are  not  only  shaped  by  formal  and  informal  institutions  but  also  by  social 
interactions. Evidence shows that if taxpayers believe tax evasion to be common, their 
tax morale decreases. In contrast, if they believe others to be honest, their tax morale 
increases. Results also indicate that social learning explains the observed conformity and 
compliance  with  social  norms  after  the  unification  of  Germany.  Tax  morale  within 
Germany  had  slowly  converged  after  unification  and  it  seems  that  the  convergence 
process has been driven by a change in tax morale among East German individuals. As a 
further natural experiment it may be interesting to look at tax morale changes over time 
in the Czech and Slovak Republics due to the separation in 1992.  
In general, in most of the studies on tax morale and tax compliance, research has 
focused on personal income tax. Business tax evasion has received very little attention. 
This is a surprise taking into account the economic importance of the business sector and 
the importance of business taxation for tax administrations. Work in this area is therefore 
highly relevant for transition countries as results indicate that self-employed taxpayers 
have  a  lower  tax  morale.  Working  with  the  Business  Environment  and  Enterprise   56 
Performance  Survey  could  provide  further  valuable  insights  (see,  e.g.,  Hellman  and 
Kaufmann, 2002; Uslaner, 2010).  
No matter how good political institutions may be, however, countries will always 
encounter difficulties in dealing with distributive issues. How one thinks about taxes and 
inequality reflects ideas of fairness or social justice (Bird et al., 2006). Income inequality 
is a central social and economic problem in many transition countries. Surprisingly, the 
link between income inequality and tax morale, tax compliance and tax performance is 
not well explored. As inequality in the distribution of wealth and income is strongly 
connected with public views as to how well the fiscal system addresses social objectives 
with  respect  to  fairness,  social  justice  and  redistribution,  a  higher  level  of  income 
inequality may lead to lower levels of trust in institutions and eventually to lower tax 
effort because of widespread tax avoidance and evasion. Highly unequal distributions of 
income can also lead to low levels of solidarity by the elites toward lower income groups. 
Furthermore, income inequality may be associated with political instability (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996). It may therefore be interesting to explore empirically the link between 
income  inequality  and  tax  morale/tax  compliance  and  tax  performance  in  transition 
countries (exploring also CEE and FSU countries independently).  
In addition, it is important to better understand tax administration‘s behavior, its 
behavior and its structure in CEE and FSU countries over time. Results in the literature 
indicate that if the tax administration tries to be honest, fair, informative, and helpful, 
acting as a service institution and thus treating taxpayers as partners and not inferiors in a 
hierarchical relationship, tax morale increases and taxpayers have stronger incentives to 
pay taxes honestly. One could, e.g., conduct surveys with tax administrations to generate 
further insights.  
In  summary,  the  findings  clearly  indicate  the  relevance  of  models  of  tax 
compliance that go beyond the conventional economics-of-crime approach and which 
capture  the  role  of  institutions,  more  in  particular,  how  individuals  perceive  their 
governments,  in  explaining  why  individuals  pay  taxes.  The  report  indicates  the 
importance  of  accountability,  democratic  governance,  efficient,  and  transparent  legal 
structures and therefore trust within the society to enforce tax compliance and tax morale.   57 
Citizens‘ perceptions how governments work and how compliant other citizens are have a 
strong impact on their willingness to comply.    58 
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Figure  1:  Correlation  between  Tax  Morale  and  the  Size  of  Shadow  Economy  in  Transition 
Countries (1999-2000) 
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Notes: Be – Belarus; Bu – Bulgaria; Cr – Croatia; Cz – Czech Republic; Hu – Hungary; La – Latvia; Li 






















Figure  2:  Correlation  between  Tax  Morale  and  the  Size  of  Shadow  Economy  in  Transition 
Countries (1994-1997 and 1999-2000) 
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Notes: Countries are denoted as in the previous figure  together with: Az – Azerbaijan; Ar – Armenia; Es – 
Estonia; Ge – Georgia; Ma – Macedonia; and Mo – Moldova.  
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Figure 3: Correlation Between Tax Morale and the Corruption Ranking 
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Notes:  Arm=Armenia,  Aze=Azerbaijan,  Bel=Belarus,  Bul=Bulgaria, 
Cro=Croatia,  Cze=Czech  Republic,  Est=Estonia,  Geo=Georgia, 
Hun=Hungary,  Lat=Latvia,  Lit=Lithuania,  Mac=Macedonia, 
Mol=Moldova, Pol=Poland, Rom=Romania, Rus=Russia, Slo=Slovenia, 
Slov=Slovak Republic, Ukr=Ukraine.    73 
 
 
Table 1: Shadow Economy, Tax Morale and Institutions 
VARIABLES  Source  Results 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE       
SHADOW ECONOMY  Schneider (2005a, b)    
GOVERNANCE/INSTITUTIONAL Q.     
ICRG     
COMPOSITE RISK RATING  ICRG  - 
POLITICAL RISK RATING  ICRG  - 
BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY  ICRG  - 
CORRUPTION  ICRG  - 
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT.  ICRG  (-) 
GOVERNMENT STABILITY  ICRG  (-) 
LAW AND ORDER  ICRG  - 
INTERNAL CONFLICT  ICRG  - 
MILITARY INTERFERENCE  ICRG  - 
AGGR.  GOVERNANCE  INDICATORS     
INDEX GOVERNANCE   Kaufmann et al. (2004)  - 
CONTROL OF CORRUP.  Kaufmann et al. (2004)  - 
POLITICAL STABILITY  Kaufmann et al. (2004)  - 
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIV.  Kaufmann et al. (2004)  - 
VOICE AND ACCOUNT.  Kaufmann et al. (2004)  (-) 
RULE OF LAW  Kaufmann et al. (2004)  - 
REGULATORY QUALITY  Kaufmann et al. (2004)  (-) 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM     
LEGAL SYSTEM   The Fraser Institute  - 
LAW AND ORDER  The Fraser Institute  - 
JUD. INDEPENDENCE   The Fraser Institute  - 
IMPARTIAL COURTS   The Fraser Institute  - 
PROPERTY RIGHTS   The Fraser Institute  - 
MILITARY INTERFERENCE  The Fraser Institute  - 
ADMINISTR. CONDITIONS  The Fraser Institute  - 
BUREAUCRACY (TIME)  The Fraser Institute  (-) 
STARTING BUSINESS  The Fraser Institute  (-) 
IRREGULAR PAYMENTS  The Fraser Institute  - 
BUSINESS REGULATIONS  The Fraser Institute  - 
WILLIGNESS TO PAY TAXES  World Values Survey   
TAX MORALE    - 
CONTROL VARIABLES     
LOG (GDP PER CAPITA)  World Development Indicators   
AGRICULTURE (% of GDP)  World Development Indicators   
URBANIZATION  World Development Indicators   
LOG (POPULATION)  World Development Indicators   
LOG (LABOR FORCE)  World Development Indicators   
TRADE (% GDP)  World Development Indicators   
TOP MARGINAL TAX RATE  The Fraser Institute   
PRICE CONTROLS  The Fraser Institute   
LABOR MARKET REGULATIONS  The Fraser Institute   
Notes:  Tendencies:  -  Reduction  of  the  shadow  economy,  always  statistically  significant..  (+)  and  (-)    mostly  or 
sometimes  statistically  significant  ((+)),  ((-)),  (almost)  never    statistically  significant.  Econometric  specification: 
SHADOWit =  + 1 CTRLit +2 GOVINSTit +3 TAXMORALEit+  TDt +REGIONi + it,  where i indexes the countries 
in the sample, SHADOWit denotes countries‘ size of the shadow economy as a percentage of the official GDP  over the 
periods 1990, 1995 and 2000. GOVINSTit are indicators for governance and institutional quality and TAXMit the level 
of tax morale. CTRLi are the control variables (see table). To control for time as well as regional invariant factors, we 
include fixed time, TDt, and fixed regional effects, REGIONi differentiating between developed, Asian and developing 
or transition countries. it  denotes the error term.  
   74 
 
Table 2: Tax Morale in Transition Countries 
 
   Mean  Mean   Mean  
Countries  1990-1993  1995-1997  1999-2000 
Central and Eastern Europe       
   Armenia    1.508   
   Bulgaria  2.038  2.24  2.316 
   Bosnia    2.172   
   Croatia    1.309  1.956 
   Czech Republic      2.209 
   Hungary  1.913    2.252 
   Macedonia    2.109   
   Montenegro    1.749   
   Poland  1.829  2.001  2.228 
   Romania  2.308    1.97 
   Slovak Republic      2.181 
   Slovenia  2.296  1.913  2.122 
   Serbia    1.969   
Average  2.077  1.886  2.154 
Former Soviet Union       
   Azerbaijan    1.634   
   Belarus  1.617  1.518  1.11 
   Estonia  2.25  1.56   
   Georgia    1.76   
   Latvia  2.155  1.379  2.113 
   Lithuania  2.089  1.687  1.433 
   Moldova    1.426   
   Russia  1.857  1.662  1.73 
   Ukraine    1.558  1.533 
Average  1.994  1.576  1.584 
Notes: Calculations from the World Values Surveys. Mean of the degree of tax morale, 
scale from 0 to 3, where 3 means the highest tax morale.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Tax Morale and Institutional Quality in Western and Eastern Europe 
WEIGHTED ORDERED 
PROBIT  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat. Marg. 
        Effects      Effects      Effects      Effects      Effects      Effects 
INDEPENDENT V.    1      2      3      4      5      6   
                                                        
Voice and Accountability  0.189***  15.99  0.075                                              
Political Stability           0.221***  18.75  0.088                                     
Government Effectiveness                    0.079***  10.80  0.031                            
Regulatory Quality                             0.160***  14.97  0.064                   
Rule of Law                                      0.093***  12.03  0.037          
Control of Corruption                                               0.061***  9.20  0.024 
OTHER VAR. INCLUDED                                                       
Pseudo R2  0.033        0.034        0.030        0.032        0.031        0.030       
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000       
clustering on countries                                       
PERCEIVED TAX EVASION  -0.193*** -5.25  -0.077 -0.192*** -5.49  -0.076 -0.184*** -4.73  -0.073 -0.190*** -5.23  -0.076 -0.186*** -4.80  -0.074 -0.185*** -4.78  -0.074 
GOVERNANCE                                     
Voice and Accountability  0.189**  2.59  0.075                                              
Political Stability           0.221**  3.27  0.088                                     
Government Effectiveness                    0.079*  1.77  0.031                            
Regulatory Quality                             0.160***  2.63  0.064                   
Rule of Law                                      0.093**  2.12  0.037          
Control of Corruption                                               0.061*  1.69  0.024 
OTHER VAR. INCLUDED                                                    
Notes: Number of observations: 31‘857. Tax morale as a dependent variable (four-point scale from 0 to 3). The results are presented with robust standard errors. The symbols *, **, 
*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The table report the marginal effects of the highest tax morale score (3). Recognizing that including 
aggregated country variables produces downwardly biased standard errors, we address the problem of heteroscedasticity by presenting standard errors adjusted for clustering on cantons 
in the lower part of the table. The estimation controls for a large set of control variables (socio-demographic, occupation and marital status, religiosity, conditional cooperation, 
Western Europe dummy).    76 
 
Table A2: The Effects of Institutions on Tax/Revenue Effort in Transition and Developing 
Countries 
Model  OLS    OLS    OLS    OLS    OLS   
Dependent Variables  Tax Effort  Tax Effort  Tax Effort  Tax Effort  Tax Effort 
                     
Independent Variables  Beta  t-Stat. Beta  t-Stat. Beta  t-Stat. Beta  t-Stat. Beta  t-Stat. 
e) INSTITUTIONS                     
INDEX GOVERNANCE  0.357***  2.95                 
VOICE AND ACCOUNT.      0.388***  3.37             
POLITICAL STABILITY          0.303***  2.79         
RULE OF LAW              0.318***  2.85     
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION                  0.381***  3.35 
Observations  104    104    104    104    104   
Prob > F  0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   
R-squared  0.445    0.499    449    0.428    0.454   
INDEX ICRG  -0.504***  3.85                 
RULE OF LAW      0.390***  2.69             
BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY         0.356***  2.97         
ETHNIC TENSION              0.291***  3.05     
CORRUPTION                  0.432***  3.87 
                     
Observations  73    73    73    73    73   
Prob > F  0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   
R-squared  0.476    0.438    0.436    0.411    0.495   
Notes: The dependent variables are: TAX EFFORT 9tax revenues/GDP). Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, 
**  0.01<  p  <  0.05,  ***  p  <  0.01.  Regressions  with  robust  standard  errors.  Estimating  beta  or  standardized 
regression coefficients. Control variables: development, openness, economic structure and regions.  
   77 
Table A3: Governance and Country Indicators in Botswana and South Africa 
   Botswana  South Africa  Year 
CPI 
a  6.1 (Ranking 24)  5 (Ranking 34)  1999 
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
b       
Control of Corruption  0.53  0.42  1998 
  1.02  0.57  2000 
Rule of Law  0.66  0.21  1998 
  0.67  0.28  2000 
Regulatory Quality  0.69  0.33  1998 
  0.79  0.12  2000 
Government Effectiveness  0.52  0.17  1998 
  0.98  0.43  2000 
Political Stability  0.89  -0.80  1998 
  0.90  -0.13  2000 
Voice and Accountability  0.77  0.87  1998 
  0.78  1.05  2000 
ICRG
c       
Composite Risk Rating  81.00  66.75  January, 1999 
Political Risk Rating  76.00  69.00  January, 1999 
Economic Risk Rating  42  31.5  January, 1999 
Law and Order   4  3  January, 1999 
Bureaucratic Quality  2  2  January, 1999 
Ethnic Tensions  5  3  January, 1999 
Democratic Accountability  3  4  January, 1999 
Corruption in Government  3  3  January, 1999 
External Conflict  10  9  January, 1999 
Government Stability  11  11  January, 1999 
Internal Conflict  12  9  January, 1999 
EHII INEQUALITY
d  48.37  44.68  1998 
Index of Economic Freedom
e       
Fiscal Burden  2.6  4.3  1999 
Government Intervention  4.5  2.5  1999 
Property Rights  2  3  1999 
Regulation  3  2  1999 
Informal Market  4  4  1999 
POLITY IV
f       
Institutionalized Democracy  9  9  1999 
Regime Durability  33  5  1999 
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION
g  0.410  0.752  1997-2001 
Notes: 
a Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (10= highly clean, 1= highly corrupt). 
b Source Kaufmann 
et al. (2004). Values between –2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better institutions (outcomes). 
c The higher 
the rating, the lower the risk and vice versa, see Knack (1999). 
d Higher GINI coefficient implies more inequality (source: 
Galbraith and Kum 2005). 
e The scores range from 1 to 5 (1=environment/set of policies are most conducive to economic 
freedom,  5=  least  conducive),  see  2005  Index  of  Economic  Freedom  handbook,  chapter  5  (see 
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/. 
f The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). Regime 
Durability: number of years since the most recent regime change or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable 
political  institutions  (see  http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/). 
g  Higher  ethnic  score  implies  a  stronger  ethnic 
fractionalization (source: Alesina et al., 2003).   78 
 
Table A4: Conditional Cooperation in Eastern and Western Europe 
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg. 
       Effects 
VARIABLE:    
 
 
PERCEIVED TAX EVASION 
COUNTRIES        
Western European Countries      
Germany   -0.330***  -6.47  -0.129 
Austria  -0.290***  -4.22  -0.113 
Belgium  -0.406***  -9.36  -0.152 
Great Britain  -0.346***  -3.75  -0.136 
Denmark  -0.479***  -7.72  -0.174 
Finland  -0.318***  -4.48  -0.126 
France  -0.211***  -4.35  -0.084 
Iceland  -0.250***  -3.37  -0.098 
Ireland  -0.373***  -5.63  -0.145 
Italy  -0.303***  -6.47  -0.119 
Malta  -0.587***  -5.2  -0.154 
Netherlands  -0.480***  -7.47  -0.19 
North Ireland  -0.150*  -1.96  -0.058 
Portugal  0.162**  2.12  0.064 
Spain  -0.086*  -1.68  -0.034 
Sweden  -0.395***  -5.28  -0.157 
Eastern European Countries    
Belarus  -0.235***  -4.59  -0.074 
Bulgaria  -0.167**  -2.32  -0.061 
Croatia  -0.385***  -4.33  -0.145 
Czech Republic  -0.282***  -5.74  -0.109 
Estonia  -0.196***  -3.46  -0.075 
Greece  -0.114**  -2.08  -0.043 
Hungary  -0.236**  -2.43  -0.085 
Latvia  -0.101**  -1.99  -0.04 
Lithuania  -0.267***  -3.7  -0.1 
Poland  -0.294***  -4.11  -0.114 
Romania  0.059  0.83  0.023 
Russia  -0.188***  -4.6  -0.074 
Slovak Republic   -0.009  -0.18  -0.003 
Ukraine  -0.227***  -3.67  -0.075 
Notes:  The  results  are  presented  with  robust  standard  errors.  The  symbols  *,  **,  ***  represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The table report the marginal 
effects  of  the  highest  tax  morale  score  (3).  The  specification  is  based  on  a  large  set  of  control 
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Table A5: Two-sample Wilcoxon Rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) Tests 
Hypothesis  z-value  Prob > |z| 
H0: Tax Morale Russia 1991 = Tax Morale Russia 1995  -4.330  0.0000 
H0: Tax Morale Russia 1991 = Tax Morale Russia 1999  -3.216  0.0013 
H0: Tax Morale Russia 1995 = Tax Morale Russia 1999  1.467  0.1423 
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FSU countries               
Belarus  -0.98  -0.15  -0.83  -2.01  -1.08  -0.60  48.1 
Estonia  0.82  0.95  0.45  1.06  0.54  0.49  38.40 
Latvia  0.72  0.54  0.19  0.72  0.08  -0.10  39.90 
Lithuania  0.84  0.54  0.18  0.21  0.19  0.07  30.30 
Russia  -0.26  -0.62  -0.62  -0.37  -0.78  -0.69  46.10 
Ukraine  -0.14  -0.19  -0.97  -0.89  -0.76  -0.89  52.20 
CEE countries               
Bulgaria  0.40  0.44  -0.94  0.47  -0.22  -0.50  36.9 
Croatia  -0.30  0.46  0.30  0.34  -0.04  0.04  33.4 
Czech Republic  1.14  0.97  0.72  0.78  0.62  0.35  19.1 
Greece  0.92  0.38  0.78  0.83  0.66  0.85  28.70 
Hungary  1.15  1.19  0.78  1.15  0.78  0.69  25.10 
Poland  1.01  0.80  0.86  0.83  0.57  0.49  27.60 
Romania  0.24  0.20  -0.61  0.30  -0.25  -0.38  34.40 
Slovakian Republic   0.45  0.95  0.08  0.29  0.13  -0.08  18.90 
Notes: Aggregated governance indicators taken from Kaufmann et al. (2004). The values range  between –2.5 and 2.5, with 
higher scores corresponding to better institutions or outcomes.  Data for the share of the shadow economy are from 
Schneider (2004, p. 24), using the DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Method.   80 
 
Table A7: Tax Morale Among Different Countries 
           
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg. 
      Effects 
INDEPENDENT V.  Eq. 3        
Western European Countries       
Germany   ref. group     
Austria  0.083*  1.650  0.033 
Belgium  -0.530***  -11.000  -0.206 
Great Britain  0.002  0.040  0.001 
Denmark  0.246***  4.630  0.096 
Finland  -0.048  -0.870  -0.019 
France  -0.288***  -5.830  -0.114 
Iceland  0.185***  3.410  0.073 
Ireland  0.072  1.220  0.028 
Italy  0.099**  2.160  0.039 
Malta  0.737***  12.380  0.264 
Netherlands  -0.251***  -4.760  -0.100 
North Ireland  0.026  0.410  0.010 
Portugal  0.044  0.650  0.017 
Spain  -0.124**  -2.380  -0.049 
Sweden  -0.067  -1.150  -0.027 
Eastern European Countries       
Belarus  -0.835***  -14.760  -0.308 
Bulgaria  0.217***  3.690  0.085 
Croatia  0.065  0.900  0.026 
Czech Republic  0.189***  4.060  0.074 
Estonia  -0.409***  -7.660  -0.161 
Greece  -0.200***  -3.840  -0.080 
Hungary  0.536***  8.650  0.200 
Latvia  -0.018  -0.320  -0.007 
Lithuania  -0.592***  -8.790  -0.228 
Poland  0.083  1.470  0.033 
Romania  -0.011  -0.200  -0.004 
Russia  -0.272***  -6.100  -0.108 
Slovakian Republic   0.115**  2.270  0.045 
Ukraine  -0.473***  -8.940  -0.185 
ALL OTHER VARIABLES INCLUDED        
Number of observations  32610       
Prob > chi2   0.000     
Notes: 30 regressions. Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale (0 to 3). Large amount 
of control factors not reported in the table.  Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (3). 
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Figure A1: Tax Compliance in Experiments done in South Africa and Botswana 
 
 
Notes: Compliance rate (declared income/obtained income). The experimental design replicates most of the 
elements of the basic structure of the personal income tax system in the study countries, as described in 
Table 4.  In the experiment, individuals receive income, pay taxes on income voluntarily reported and face 
a probability of audit. If they are detected cheating, individuals must pay a financial penalty on taxes not 
reported.  Of course, incarceration is not a possible penalty in the experimental setting.  There are three 
basic  fiscal  parameters  that  affect  decisions  on  tax  compliance:  tax  rate,  probability  of  detection,  and 
penalty (or fine) rate.  The maintained hypothesis is that risk attitudes are the same across the cultures being 
investigated.  This is tested with a willingness to bear risk experiment and confirmed with the results being 
reported below.  The experimental setting controls for tax rate, probability of detection, and penalty rates.  
The different pools are subjected to the same parameters.  Thus, the observed differences in tax compliance 
behavior are interpreted as being motivated by: differences in those institutional features affecting attitudes 
toward  the  government  (the  fiscal  exchange)  and  by  other  possible  factors  that  may  be  described  as 
differences in the inhibitors or social norms across the countries.  To the extent that social norms can be 
influenced by the same factors that affect attitudes toward government, or by the perceived fiscal exchange, 
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Notes: Mean values in these three time periods, calculated as the simple average across all individuals in the 
data sets.  We observe a significant decay of tax morale between 1991 and 1995, from 1.86 to 1.66.  (Recall 
that a higher number indicates higher tax morale.)  In the next four years tax morale recovered, with an 
increase from 1.66 to 1.73.  Thus, we observe on average a decline in the willingness to pay taxes during the 
first 4 years of the transition and a less than full recovery in the following 4 years.  
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